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Abstract 
‘War over water in the Middle East’ was for many years a popular prediction among social 
scientists. A water-war however has yet to occur anywhere in the world. In this thesis I focus 
on the case of Jordan, Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories and their shared water 
resources. I analyze the empirical evidence with the aim of investigating whether a neo-realist 
or a neo-liberal explanation for the absence of war over water finds most support. The main 
finding of this research project is that water not having been considered a ‘high politics’ issue 
by Israel and thus not a resource worth fighting over, is the strongest explanatory argument 
for stability. Although all three Parties strongly value the dialogue established under the 
umbrella of the Multilateral Working Group on Water, the cooperation has few results to 
show for, a fact which constitutes a second indication that water is not a sufficiently important 
resource worth making sacrifices for.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Water 
When the well is dry, we know the worth of water (Benjamin Franklin 1746).  
 
75% of the Earth’s surface is covered by water, which is found mostly in oceans and other 
large water bodies. Only 2.5% of the Earth’s surface water is fresh water, fit for human 
consumption. Of this 2.5% only 0.5% is available ground water and 0.01% is the readily 
accessible water in lakes, streams and rivers. The rest is located in ice caps (EWG 2011; 
Graham et al. 2000). Water on Earth moves continually through a cycle of evaporation, 
precipitation, and runoff usually reaching the sea. Freshwater which is the only potable water 
type naturally accessible to humans exists only in limited amounts. This in combination with 
factors such as population growth, pollution and droughts caused by climate change, has 
caused water shortages in several regions in the world. The excerpt below, from a 2009’ 
UNESCO report, illustrates the situation of water stress.  
 
Box 1.1.1 ”UNESCO: Water in a Changing World” 
The amount of freshwater on Earth is finite, but its distribution has varied considerably, driven mainly by 
natural cycles of freezing and thawing and fluctuations in precipitation, water runoff patterns and 
evapotranspiration levels. That situation has changed, however. Alongside natural causes are new and 
continuing human activities that have become primary ‘drivers’ of the pressures affecting our planet’s 
water systems. These pressures are most often related to human development and economic growth.  
History shows a strong link between economic development and water resources development. There are 
abundant examples of how water has contributed to economic development and how development has 
demanded increased harnessing of water. Such benefits came at a cost and in some places led to increasing 
pressure on the environment and increasing competition among users. Our requirements for water to meet 
our fundamental needs and our collective pursuit of higher living standards, coupled with the need for 
water to sustain our planet’s fragile ecosystems, make water unique among our planet’s natural resources. 
Important decisions affecting water management are made outside the water sector and are driven by 
external, largely unpredictable drivers – demography, climate change, the global economy, changing 
societal values and norms, technological innovation, laws and customs, and financial markets. Many of 
these external drivers are dynamic and changing at a faster pace. Developments outside the water domain 
influence water management strategies and policies. Decisions in other sectors and those related to 
development, growth and livelihoods need to incorporate water as an integral component, including 
responses to climate change, food and energy challenges and disaster management  
(Source: UNESCO 2009: xix). 
 
2 
 
1.2 Water Stress in the Middle East 
The Middle East is regarded as the region in the world suffering the most from water scarcity 
(Brown & Crawford 2009). The high population growth rates in the region place a 
tremendous strain on the availability of freshwater for human consumption and economic 
development. Most of the countries in the Middle East can be described as “water poor”. 
Kuwait and the Gaza strip are the most water poor places in the world with approximately 50 
m³ available per person per year1
 
. The demand for water resources for basic needs, 
agricultural purposes, and industrial uses will according to Brown and Crawford outpace the 
supply of renewable water resources in the Middle East within the next few decades (2009).  
As water scarcity increases and the quality of existing resources decreases, states have been 
forced to either augment their water supply, which has created an incentive for some upstream 
states to harness their water supplies through building dams to the disadvantage of 
downstream states (which are heavily dependent upon these same water resources for 
agricultural purposes) or to over pump their existing resources, which has created negative 
externalities for the downstream users. This competition over resources has, according to the 
Nordic Consulting Group turned water into one of the main strategic resources in the Middle 
East (2004: 84).  
 
The water resources in the region have a transboundary characteristic. There are numerous 
shared rivers and groundwater basins (e.g. Tigris River, Euphrates River, Nile River, Jordan 
River, and the three aquifers underlying the West Bank, the Coastal aquifer, the Disi aquifer, 
and the Nubian sandstone aquifer).  Every major river in the region crosses an international 
border, and most of the aquifers are shared by at least two states (NCG 2004). This 
complicates the situation of water stress further because of the externalities produced by 
transnational use of the resources.  
 
                                                 
1 According to the UN threshold a country/an area is defined as suffering from water scarcity if freshwater 
access per person per year is less than 1000 cubic metres (United Nations, World Resources Institute 2007). 
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Water management in the Middle East is also made more difficult by the lack of knowledge 
and information required for decision-making and long-term planning. Few countries know 
how much water is being used and for what purposes, the quantity and quality of water that is 
available and that can be withdrawn without serious environmental consequences and how 
much is being invested in water management and infrastructure (UNESCO 2009: 18).  
 
1.3 War over Water in the Middle East? 
As environmental issues and resource management found their place on the political agenda 
at the end of the Cold War, the aggravating water situation along with the regions’ conflictual 
history led several scholars to predict the outbreak of wars over water in the Middle East. The 
comprehensive literature predicting such outcomes convinced political leaders and 
international actors across the globe, and still has implications for policy development – as 
illustrated by the excerpts below from the 2009’ UNESCO water report, and the 2008’ Ban 
Ki-moon speech:  
 
Water is linked to the crises of climate change, energy and food supplies and prices, and troubled 
financial markets. Unless their links with water are addressed and water crises around the world are 
resolved, these other crises may intensify and local water rises may worsen, converging into a global 
water crisis and leading to political insecurity and conflict at various levels (UNESCO 2009: xx). 
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More recent research however has shown that war or conflict over water is not a very 
probable outcome of water scarcity. Water scarcity actually leads to cooperation more often 
than to conflict or tension between states (Beaumont 1996: 356; Wolf 1998; Yoffe & Wolf 
1999; Alam 2002; Waterbury 2002; Priscoli and Wolf 2009: 11). This issue is at the essence 
of my research project: Why is it that in the region in the world suffering the most from water 
scarcity, where states have exhibited little reluctance towards going to war over almost any 
issue, we still haven’t seen the outbreak of a war over water? 
 
In order to address this question the research project focuses on water management in Jordan, 
Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories2
                                                 
2 The occupied Palestinian territories will throughout the paper be referred to as the oPt.  
. Meanwhile, I wish to emphasize that I will not 
attempt to conduct an exhaustive study analyzing all possible explanations for the absence of 
war over water. The theoretical focus will be on central theories within the field of 
International Relations, and the empirical focus will be on the perceptions of central political 
Box 1.3.1 Speech by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2008 
‘The challenge of securing safe and plentiful water for all is one of the most daunting challenges faced by the 
world today.’ 
‘Until only recently, we generally assumed that water trends do not pose much risk to our businesses. While many 
countries have engaged in waste-water treatment and some conservation efforts, the notion of water sustainability 
in a broad sense has not been seriously examined.’  
‘Our experiences tell us that environmental stress due to lack of water may lead to conflict and would be greater 
in poor nations.’  
‘Ten years ago – even five years ago – few people paid much attention to the arid regions of western Sudan. Not 
many noticed when fighting broke out between farmers and herders, after the rains failed and water became 
scarce.’  
‘Today everyone knows Darfur. More than 200,000 people have died. Several million have fled their homes. 
‘There are many factors at work in this conflict, of course. But almost forgotten is the event that touched it off – 
drought. A shortage of life’s vital resource.’  
‘We can change the names in this sad story. Somalia. Chad. Israel. The occupied Palestinian territories. Nigeria. 
Sri Lanka. Haiti. Colombia. Kazakhstan. All are places where shortages of water contribute to poverty. They 
cause social hardship and impede development. They create tensions in conflictprone regions. Too often, where 
we need water we find guns. . . .’ 
(Source: Ban Ki-moon 2008) 
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actors in the region. An assessment of the water resources shared by the three entities Jordan 
Israel and the oPt follows in the section below.  
  
1.4 Water Scarcity in Jordan, Israel and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories 
The water sources in the West Bank are the renewable waters of the mountain aquifer that 
rises and outcrops in the West Bank but extends across and below the territories of Israel (see 
map 1.4.1 “Mountain and Coastal Aquifers in the Jordan River Basin”). The main recharge 
acceptance area is located in the core of the West Bank where water originating at altitudes 
above 400 meters feed the major aquifers in the area. The groundwater recharge in the West 
Bank is the direct infiltration of rainwater through fractured, karstic rocks and porous soils. 
The overall balance in the West Bank is estimated to be 679 million cubic metres (mcm) per 
year, while in the Gaza Strip it is estimated at 50 mcm per year. The Gaza aquifer, which is a 
classical coastal aquifer, represents the sole water source of the Gaza Strip covering an area of 
360 km². The Gaza aquifer is threatened by seawater and salt ground water intrusion due to 
over pumping, and by pollution (NCG 2004: 85).  
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Map 1.4.1 Mountain and Coastal Aquifers in the Jordan River Basin 
 
(Source: UNEP 2002) 
The Jordan River has an annual flow of 1300 mcm. The main rivers in Jordan are the Jordan, 
the Yarmouk, and the Zarqa. While the availability of water in the Jordan and the Yarmouk 
River is good, the Zarqa River, flowing entirely within Jordan’s borders, faces a pollution 
crisis that prohibits both access to and the use of its waters.  
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After the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948, the main target of the Israeli water plan 
was to divert as much water outside the Jordan River basin into a central conduit leading 
through the coastal plain up the northern Negev. The National Water Carrier (see map 1.4.2 
“The Jordan River and the Israeli National Water Carrier”), a pipeline transporting water from 
the Sea of Galilea/Lake Tiberias in the north, to the highly populated and arid south, was 
opened in 1964. The National Water Carrier was the outcome of long term planning, its first 
stages implemented in 1948. One of the major outcomes of the 1967 war was the annexation 
of large parts of the headwaters of the Jordan River by Israel, and the subsequent loss to 
Jordan of a significant amount of its available water supply. A key issue concerning water 
resources between the three countries has been the Israeli policy of restricting water 
allocations and water use in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which deprives the Palestinian 
population of their basic human rights for adequate water, both in quality and quantity (NCG 
2004: 85).  
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Map 1.4.2 The Jordan River and the Israeli National Water Carrier 
 
(Source: Hudes 1999) 
 
The Jordan River begins in three headwaters. The Hasbani River, which originates in Syria 
with parts of its flow in Lebanon and has an average flow of 140 mcm/year. The Dan and 
Bania Rivers both originate in the Golan Heights and flow into the Jordan River above Lake 
Tiberias with average annual flows of 250 and 120 mcm respectively. The lower Jordan River 
is fed from groundwater flow and runoff from the West Bank, Syrian and Jordanian waters, 
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and by the Yarmouk River, which originates in Syria, borders Jordan, Syria and the Golan 
Heights, and has an average flow of 420 mcm/year. In 1953 US special envoy to the Middle 
East, Ambassador Eric Johnston, proposed an allocation scheme based on proposals 
negotiated between the Ottoman Empire and the US before WWI. Johnston’s Jordan Valley 
Plan was the product of his negotiation with representatives of Israel, Lebanon and Syria for 
24 months, which finally in 1955, led to a unified plan that in his view reconciled the 
demands of all the riparians. The plan was never adopted or ratified (Soffer 1994).   
 
In 1994 a peace treaty was established between Jordan and Israel. Allocation of water 
resources was one of the major issues of the Treaty. The Treaty also stipulates that Israel will 
help Jordan to find new sources of water, to build a system of water storage on the Jordan 
River and the dams of the River, and to divert more water from the Yarmouk River towards 
Jordan (NCG 2004: 87).     
 
1.5 Outline of the research project 
In Chapter 2 “Theoretical Approach” I discuss the theories of the 1980s and 1990s’ dominant 
approach that water scarcity leads to “water wars”. In this chapter I also briefly assess the 
current conditions in the Middle East, which can be said to represent the most prominent case 
of the combination “water scarce and conflict prone region”. Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) is 
one of the authors presented in Chapter 2. He argues that under a special set of conditions 
related to the direction of water flow and the power relations between the 
upstream/downstream party the probability for outbreak of a conflict is high. The case of 
bilateral relations Israel-the Palestinian Authorities (PA)3
 
 meets all of Homer-Dixon’s 
conditions, and can thus be said to represent a “most likely”-case for conflict over water. In 
reality however no such conflict has actually occurred, instead the three Parties Israel, the PA 
and Jordan are part of a multilateral cooperation on water resources. This fact leads us to the 
research question: How can we explain the absence of war over water in the Middle East?  
                                                 
3 The Palestinian National Authority (PNA/PA) will be referred to as the PA throughout the paper.  
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In chapter 2 I also assess some of the possible explanations for this absence of war, with 
arguments based in neo-liberal theory that trade, treaty and technology have made war over 
water resources anachronistic. To conclude the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2, I 
present two hypothetical explanations for the absence of war over water. The first (H1) being 
that water is not a sufficiently important issue to go to war over in a region where high 
politics dominate, and the second (H2) being that water is a resource which is fundamentally 
too important for people’s survival to go to war over.  
 
In Chapter 3 “Methodological Approach” I outline the method I will use to examine which of 
the hypothetical explanations finds support in the empirical evidence. The chapter commences 
with a brief presentation of the main affinities and inconveniences linked to the case study as 
a method used for examining the research question. This first part is followed by a discussion 
of why the case under study to some extent can be used to say something general about the 
Middle East as a region, as well as an assessment of the “pros and cons” of using method 
triangulation with interviews and content analysis to address the research question. Chapter 3 
is concluded with a note on the validity and reliability of the study.  
 
In Chapter 4 I proceed to the actual analysis of the data material. I give a short presentation of 
the Multilateral Working Group on Water which is a forum where Israeli, Palestinian and 
Jordanian representatives meet twice per year to discuss issues related to freshwater resources 
and wastewater treatment. I also give a presentation of the representatives with which I have 
conducted interviews, as well as their relation to their respective authorities’ water 
management institutions. The analysis concentrates around an assessment of the empirical 
evidence with H1 and H2 as base arguments. To conclude the analysis I argue that the actual 
explanation for the absence of war over water in the Middle East is situated somewhere 
between H1 and H2 as the explanation draws on both neo-liberal and neo-realist arguments, 
but that H1 finds stronger support in the empirical evidence than H2.    
 
In Chapter 5 “Conclusion” I sum up the most important findings and provide some advice for 
future research.       
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2. Theoretical Framework  
Evidence is fast accumulating that, within our children’s lifetimes, severe droughts, storms and heat 
waves caused by climate change could rip apart societies from one side of the planet to the other. 
Climate stress may well represent a challenge to international security just as dangerous – and more 
intractable – than the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war or 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons among rouge states today (Homer-Dixon 2007: 1). 
 
The citation is taken from a polemic article in the New York Times in 2007, written by 
Thomas Homer-Dixon. He claims that there is “Terror in the Weather Forecast” and warns 
that the potential impact of climate change on food output is a particular concern; in semiarid 
regions where water is already scarce and cropland overused, climate change could devastate 
agriculture. He predicts that this will undermine already frail governments, and reveal how 
incapable these are of helping their citizens. Accordingly, the ultimate result will be 
insurgencies, genocide, guerilla attacks, gang warfare and global terrorism (Homer-Dixon 
2007: 2).  
 
Thomas Homer-Dixon does not stand alone in predicting pessimistic consequences of water 
scarcity. The same year that he published “Terror in the Weather Forecast”, Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon told delegates from across the Asian-Pacific region that 
the planet faced a water crisis especially troubling for Asia, and that “a struggle by nations to 
secure sources of clean water will be “potent fuel” for wars and conflict” (Lewis 2007). Ban 
Ki-moon was however not the first UN Secretary-General to predict a “water war”. In 1985 
the Egyptian Foreign Minister Dr Boutros Ghali famously stated that "the next war in the 
Middle East will be fought over water, not politics", and he repeated this claim during his 
period as Secretary-General for the United Nations from 1992-1996 (BBC 2003). According 
to Boutros Ghali it was particularly population growth that would put further strain on water 
supplies and thus create a potential for disputes in the Middle East. Another predecessor to 
Ban Ki-moon and Homer-Dixon, Ismail Serageldin, the World Bank Vice President at the 
time, in 1995 famously prophesied that “[i]f the wars of this century were fought over oil, the 
wars of the next century will be fought over water”. 
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A look back into history shows that the issue of conflict over scarce resources is not a recent 
phenomenon. Genesis 26:17-18 in the Old Testament tells us something about how crucial 
access to freshwater was to farmers more than 3000 years ago:  
 
The desolate Gerar area was located on the edge of a desert. Water was as precious as gold. A person 
who dug a well was staking a claim to the land. Some wells had locks to keep thieves from steeling the 
water. To fill in someone’s well with dirt was an act of war; it was one of the most serious crimes in the 
land.  
 
The Oxford Dictionaries etymology of the world “rival” follows in the same path as the Old 
Testament, indicating that shared freshwater rivers have been a source of conflict for several 
hundred years:  
 
Rival. –noun: a person or entity that is in a position to dispute another's pre-eminence or superiority. 
Origin: 1570–80; Latin: rīvālis.  Originally; one who uses a stream in common with another, equivalent 
to rīv ( us ) stream + 
 
-ālis (Oxford Dictionaries) 
Meanwhile, the assumption that resource scarcity represents a highly potential source of 
conflict is more than a historical myth, or scare tactics by UN high officials. The claims also 
find support in the research literature on the field. In the following sections I present the main 
arguments from the Environmental Security and the Water-War literature, as well as the Neo-
Malthusian perspectives on the potential consequences of resource scarcity. I also discuss 
possible explanations for why, despite the research literature’s pessimistic predictions, there 
has been no war over water in the Middle East.  
 
2.1 Environmental Security 
Environmental security is one of a number of ‘new’, non-traditional security issues that have 
served to deepen and broaden the concept of security during the last decades. It emerged as an 
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important concept in security studies due to interrelated developments beginning in the 1960s. 
First environmental movements in developed countries managed to raise the profile of 
environmental issues and contest the practices of national security. Secondly, their claims that 
environmental problems demand common security approaches were recognized by scholars in 
political science and security studies. Thirdly, by the end of the Cold War and with the switch 
in the world order from a bipolar to a hegemonic system, a strategic vacuum appeared which 
permitted environmental issues to be put on states’ security agendas (Barnett 2007: 200, 
Gleditsch & Diehl 2001: 252). Environmental issues were also recognized through a growth 
in multilateral environmental agreements (Barnett 2007: 200).  
 
Even though “environmental security” has been an important concept in security studies since 
the 1990s, the term remains ambiguous (Barnett 2007: 200). There are many different 
interpretations of environmental security stemming from the numerous approaches to security 
and the even broader range of approaches to environmental change. The most commonly used 
definition however, is the approach that environmental change undermines human security:  
 
The most influential interpretations of environmental security are those that fit well with the orthodox 
security paradigm. In particular, arguments that environmental change may be a cause of violent 
conflict between and within countries, and suggestions that environmental problems in other countries 
are threats to national security, have all largely been accepted by the security policy community and the 
armed forces – especially in the United States (Barnett 2007: 200).    
 
Political ecologists were early in arguing that environmental issues should be considered a 
security matter. In 1971 Harald and Margaret Sprout published “Toward a Politics of the 
Planet Earth” where they explain the ecological way of comprehending international politics; 
“a system of relationships among interdependent, earth-related communities that share with 
one another an increasingly crowded planet that offer finite and exhaustible quantities of basic 
essentials of human well-being and existence” (Sprout & Sprout 1971: 14). According to the 
political ecologists individuals and populations interact with the environment in patterns that 
constitute a system; an ecosystem. Any serious disruption anywhere in the earth’s 
“ecosystems” is likely to produce injurious consequences for the human inhabitants as well as 
for the subhuman species with which humans share the earth (Sprout & Sprout 1971: 15).  
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The Sprouts also argued that the security threats that environmental degradation represents 
will put a heavy strain on states’ national security budgets (1971: 406).  
 
Richard Falk was another early adherent to the idea that environmental degradation should be 
considered a security issue. In his book “This endangered planet”, he stated that “We need to 
revamp our entire concept of “national security” and “economic growth” if we are to solve the 
problems of environmental decay” (1971: 185). Furthermore he emphasized that states would 
not be able to solve the problems of environmental decay on their own, arguing that some 
coordination between them would be fundamental (1971: 196).  
 
Several of the early writers on the connections between environmental change and violence 
borrowed heavily from realist international relations theory and focused on the link between 
resource scarcity and the possibility for conflict between and tension within states. Lester R. 
Brown (1977) was one of the first to point to the risks of climate change negatively affecting 
agricultural production and global food supplies. Brown stated his concern that “[i]t is also 
quite possible that food scarcities and soaring food prices may contribute more than any other 
factor to political instability” (1977: 30). Basing their arguments on realist assumptions that 
economic globalization can accentuate existing differences in societies, creating instability in 
strategic regions and thereby challenging the world order, the early Environmental Security 
theorists argued that “the pressure engendered by population growth in the Third World is 
bound to degrade the quality of life, and diminish the range of options available, to 
governments and persons in the rich countries” (Ullman 1983: 143).  
 
In his article “The Environmental Dimension to Security Issues” published in 1986, Norman 
Myers continues in the same line as Falk and Ullman stating that environmental stability 
underpins our material welfare and thus represents a security issue: 
 
If a nation’s environmental foundations are depleted, its economy will steadily decline, its social fabric 
deteriorate, and its political structure become destabilized. The outcome is all too likely to be conflict, 
whether conflict in the form of disorder an insurrection within the nation, or tension and hostilities with 
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other nations. We can surely expect that this new scope for conflict will expand as increasing numbers 
of people seek to sustain themselves from declining resource stocks (Myers 1986: 251).  
 
The argument that environmental problems should be considered a security issue did not seem 
to lack support in the political science literature at the end of the 20th century. The Correlates 
of War Data Project (2007) indicates that over 80% of interstate wars are among neighbors. In 
his 1995’ article “Why Do Neighbors Fight?”, John A. Vasquez explains that war between 
states is generally a result of territorial disputes: “The situation that states in the modern 
global system are most likely to deal with by the use of force and violence is one in which 
their territory is threatened” (1995: 281). Claims over territory mean access to an economic 
zone, raw materials, sources of energy, water and food (Vasquez 1995: 282; Gleditsch & 
Diehl 2001: 252). The territorial explanation for interstate war can thus be said to provide 
support for the Environmental Security theorists’ claim that resource scarcity is a potential 
source of conflict.  Some scientists have developed this thesis even further, claiming that it is 
not only territorial disputes or environmental degradation in general which should be 
considered a threat to national security, it is more precisely the strive for access to freshwater 
resources that will cause war between states. This approach is often referred to as “the Water-
War literature” in political science.  
 
2.1.1 The Water-War Literature 
There are several arguments for why war over water is a probable outcome of water scarcity. 
The writers within the water-war approach usually base their assumptions on one or several of 
the following arguments (Lonergan 1997: 376): 
 
• Water is the basis for all life on this planet; 
• Water is essential for human survival and for the production of food; 
• Water is crucial for economic development, and in some countries is one of the 
highest valued inputs to the national economy; 
• The freshwater resources of the globe are finite and vulnerable; 
16 
 
• Water “moves”, and therefore its use may affect more than one nation; 
• Globally, much freshwater is far removed from sources of demand.  
 
In 1984 John Cooley argued that the struggle over freshwater resources of the Jordan, Litani, 
Orontes and the Yarmuk had been one of the principle causes of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 
According to Cooley, the Arabs had unsuccessfully tried to divert the Jordan River 
headwaters feeding into Israel. Cooley also predicted that at the time of writing, the primary 
threat of war stemmed from Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, which gave Israel 
control over the lower reaches of the Litani. In this same line he also claimed that many of the 
problems and the tensions between countries in the Middle East stem from their shared 
freshwater resources, and the fact that “all of the water development plans of the region’s 
countries depend on tapping the region’s rivers” (1984: 10).  This corresponds to the neo-
realist view that states will seek to maximize their relative gains, and reduce dependence on 
others. Accordingly, Cooley stated that 
 
(…) to the Arabs in the 1950s, the National Water Carrier became a symbol of Israel’s aggressive 
expansionism. As early as 1953, Syrian artillery units opened fire on the construction and engineering 
sites behind the town and lake of Tiberias, forcing the Israelis to move the main pumping station (1984: 
10).   
 
He also predicted that “Long after oil runs out, water is likely to cause wars, cement peace, 
and make and break empires and alliances in the region” (1984: 10).   
  
In 1991 Joyce R. Starr followed in Cooley’s tracks, with the publication of an article entitled 
“Water Wars”. Starr equally claimed that there is a pertinent risk of war over water in the 
world, as the problem of water scarcity is aggravating. According to Starr, the Middle Eastern 
region is especially exposed to an eruption of war because of its characteristics as a region 
already prone to conflict, suffering largely from the lack of access to clean water. She pointed 
out the end of the Gulf war as a potential time for the outbreak of war over water (1991:19). 
She also claimed that the past record of disputes over water in the region is evident, and she 
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especially mentioned a situation in 1975 where “Iraq and Syria came to the brink of war over 
Syria’s reduction of the flow of the Euphrates to fill the Ath-Thawrah Dam” (1991: 31).  
 
In the same line as Cooley and Starr, Arun Elhance summarizes why, in a neo-realistic 
perspective, scarcity of natural resources may lead to interstate conflict; 
 
By itself scarcity of natural resources does not necessarily lead to interstate conflict (…). It is when 
such a resource is rightly or wrongly perceived as being overexploited or degraded by others at a cost to 
oneself, that states may become prone to conflict (1999: 4).  
 
2.2.2 The Neo-Malthusian Approach 
Another perspective which has gained support during the last decade is the Neo-Malthusian 
approach to resource scarcity and conflict. Neo-Malthusianism originated from the ideas of 
Thomas Robert Malthus who argued that population growth is geometric whereas agricultural 
growth is arithmetic; therefore, population growth will increase at such a rate that eventually 
there will not be enough food for the population (Malthus 1998; Gleditsch & Diehl 2001: 
252). Today Neo-Malthusianism is used as a label for scientists who are concerned that 
overpopulation may increase resource depletion or environmental degradation to a degree that 
is not sustainable, possibly resulting in ecological collapse or other hazards.  
 
The relationship between population, environmental change and violent conflict was 
systematically explored by Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999) through the Toronto project and 
Guenther Bächler (1999) through the ENCOP (Environment and Conflict Project). Their basic 
assumption was that the growing level of resource scarcity and specifically water scarcity will 
increase competition in face of a growing population, eventually becoming a trigger for 
resource conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999; Bächler et al. 1999; Gleditsch 1997: 94).  Homer-
Dixon presented a model explaining how environmental scarcity and its social effects can 
cause both rural and urban violence. He argues that the genesis of scarcity and scarcity’s main 
negative social effects contribute to violent conflict, and explains this by referring to group-
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identity theories and structural theories. He identifies three main kinds of conflict that might 
arise from environmental scarcity: simple-scarcity conflicts, group identity conflicts, and 
insurgencies (1999: 137). He also proposes a set of conditions, which if present highly 
increases the potential for conflict:   
 
Wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are likely only on a narrow set of 
circumstances: the downstream country must be highly dependent on the water for its national well-
being; the upstream country must be threatening to restrict substantially the river’s flow; there must be a 
history of antagonism between the two countries; and, most importantly, the downstream country must 
believe it is military stronger than the upstream country. Downstream countries often fear that their 
upstream neighbors will use water as a means of leverage. This situation is particularly dangerous if the 
downstream country also believes it has the military power to rectify the situation (Homer-Dixon 1999: 
138).   
 
Homer-Dixon also provides a typology of the causes of resource scarcity. He applies a 
threefold definition consisting of supply-induced, demand-induced and structural scarcities 
(1999: 48). Supply-induced scarcity occurs as a result of decline in the quantity or quality of a 
renewable resource. Demand-induced scarcities arise with resources that are rivalrous. A good 
or resource is rivalrous when its use by one economic actor reduces its availability for others. 
Water scarcity is by Homer-Dixon considered to be such a demand-induced scarcity. 
Structural scarcities arise primarily with resources that are excludable, which means that 
property rights or other institutions can be used to prevent access to the resource by some 
actors (Homer-Dixon 1999: 48). Particularly relevant here is the demand-induced type of 
scarcity: “Demand-induced scarcity is a function of population size multiplied by per capita 
demand for a given resource; an increase in either population or per capita demand increases 
total resource demand” (Homer-Dixon 1999: 51). According to Homer-Dixon (1999: 73) the 
three kinds of environmental scarcity often interact, and two patterns of interaction are 
particularly common: resource capture and ecological marginalization. Resource capture 
occurs when a fall in the quality and quantity of a renewable resource interacts with 
population growth to encourage powerful groups within a society to shift resource distribution 
in their favor. This shift can produce dire environmental scarcity for poorer and weaker 
groups in society. Accordingly, the social effects of environmental scarcity can substantially 
increase the probability of violence in developing countries (Homer-Dixon 1999: 80).       
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2.3 Assessing the Middle Eastern Conditions 
The Middle East has for the last 60 years been the most conflict prone region in the world4. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has functioned as an underlying cause for strategic alliances 
between Arab countries against the state of Israel. Israel who is military superior to most of its 
Arab neighbors has with the support of the US not hesitated to attack or retaliate to attacks5. 
The existential conflicts, territorial disputes, denials of legitimacy along with a fundamental 
asymmetry, have made the Middle East a region where “high politics” set the standard for 
bilateral relations which have generally been characterized by instability and competition 
(Steinberg 2005). During the first quarter of 2011 the Arab countries have seen uprisings and 
popular revolt spreading throughout the region, caused by the population’s dissatisfaction 
with authoritarian rule dominant in these countries for the last 60 years.6 More than six 
decades of conflict have taken a heavy toll on the region; tens of thousands of lives have been 
lost7
 
; roads, wells and power grids have been destroyed; businesses, schools and hospitals 
have closed, and farmers have been cut off from their fields. Products cannot reach markets, 
and trade between several countries is severely hindered. Most of the governments in the 
Middle East prefer spending money on weapons and armies, rather than on social services for 
their populations (Brown & Crawford 2009: 11).  
The Euphrates River, the Nile and the Jordan River have all seen water related tensions over 
the past decades, and the importance of water to the region was emphasized during the peace 
process initiated in the 1990s, in which water was one of five key topics identified for 
multilateral discussions8
 
 (Lonergan 1997: 378).  
                                                 
4 The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset has 259 conflict registered for the Middle East region from 1946-
2009.  
5 E.g when the killing of two Israeli soldiers, and the capture of one by Hamas in June 2006 led to a massive 
reprisal that killed dozens of Palestinians and destroyed essential infrastructure throughout Gaza (Mearsheimer 
& Walt 2006: 39).   
6 Since independence from colonial rule by Great Britain and France, which for most countries in the Middle 
East took place during the years following WWII.  
7 60 of the 259 conflict registered in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset are listed as wars with more than 
1000 battle deaths.  
8 See chapter 4 for a presentation of the multilateral discussions.  
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The Middle East is also the region in the world suffering the most from water scarcity (Brown 
& Crawford 2009: 6). Jordan, Israel and the oPt all fall well below the accepted threshold for 
water scarcity of 1,000 cubic metres per person per year. According to the IPCC9
 
, Israel has 
available natural renewable water resources of 265 m³, Jordan 169 m³ and the oPt 90 m³ 
(Brown & Crawford 2009: 11; Boko et al. 2007). Only Lebanon with 1,220 m³ and Syria with 
1,541 m³ fall above the water scarcity threshold. The countries in the region are already using 
a very high percentage of their available water resources. The Middle East withdraws the 
world’s highest proportion of its total renewable water resources (Brown & Crawford 2009: 
11). The relative lack of rainfall means there is a heavy reliance on groundwater and 
manufactured (i.e. desalinated) water. By 2020 it is predicted that water shortages will be the 
norm, with water requirements projected to be 130 per cent of renewable supplies for Israelis, 
120 per cent for Jordanians and 150 per cent for Palestinians. In Lebanon water demand is 
expected to outstrip supply by 2015 (Brown & Crawford 2009: 11). This means that without 
large-scale desalination, improved water efficiency or possibly international transfers of 
water, the region’s renewable water resources will be unable to provide for everyone’s needs. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that a high proportion of water in the region is 
transboundary. The Jordan River, which is a crucial water source for Israel, the oPt and 
Jordan, is supplied by tributaries in Lebanon and Syria. More than four-fifths of the renewable 
water resources in Syria originate from outside its borders. Jordan shares the Azraq Aquifer 
with Syria, and the Disi Aquifer with Saudi Arabia.   
 
Control over water resources has been a central issue for Israel ever since the establishment of 
the Jewish state in 1948. The existence of the state of Israel is to a considerable degree, the 
product of the Zionist movement’s concerns for the security and survival of world Jewry, 
given irreversible momentum with the rise of Nazism in central Europe in the 1930s. 
Unrestricted access to water resources has always been perceived as a non-negotiable 
prerequisite for the survival of a Jewish national home, as the idea of rural agricultural 
settlement is a central part of Zionist ideology (Lowi 1993: 123; Galnoor 1980). During the 
last decades, and as revealed in the Israeli Comptroller report of 1990, the Israeli water 
                                                 
9 IPCC: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  
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subsidy policy has come to constitute a major economic burden on the Israeli Government. 
The main guidelines of Israeli water policy have consisted of under pricing, distorted and 
discriminatory pricing, and gross misallocation among water users (NCG 2004: 24). 
Beaumont (1997) describes the Israeli water policy as “water piracy”. He claims that the 
Israeli authorities are using real or implied force to gain access to water which according to 
international law does not belong to it. One example is the use of the waters of the Yarmouk 
River on the borders of Syria, Jordan and Israel. For many years Jordan planned to utilize the 
waters of the Yarmouk to supply the East Ghor canal. To do this properly would require the 
construction of a diversion and storage facility in the lower part of the Yarmouk catchment. 
This would have to be constructed on land outside of the state of Israel. Israel however, on 
several occasions used military power to disrupt any such construction on the dam whenever 
this was attempted by Jordanian Authorities. The result being that the water which Jordan had 
hoped to use continued to flow downstream and was “captured” by Israel for its own use 
(Elmusa 1995: 63).  
 
A second example of Israeli “water piracy” or Israeli “resource capture strategy”10
                                                 
10 As Homer-Dixon (1999: 75) labels it.  
 is the 
extraction of groundwater. Since the Israeli invasion and occupation of the Palestinian West 
Bank in 1967, the Arab inhabitants of the region have been severely limited in terms of their 
water resources. Due to the geological nature of the region and the predominance of 
limestone, most of the region’s water resources take the form of groundwater. From a 
hydrological point of view, a large proportion of the water that falls on the West Bank makes 
its way westwards through the ground to emerge in springs in Israel. Beaumont (1997) 
explains that this in effect becomes an “upstream/downstream” situation. The Palestinian 
West Bank is the upstream region where the precipitation is collected and put into the ground, 
while Israel is the downstream nation where the water emerges. Over the years, Israel has 
continued to extract the water that falls on the Palestinian West Bank without any reduction in 
volume. The Israeli military regime that has occupied the West Bank since the invasion in 
1967 has restricted the Palestinians use of groundwater through limiting the numbers of wells 
they are allowed to drill, by limiting the amount of water they are allowed to pump, as well as 
the times during which they can draw irrigation water (Homer-Dixon 1999: 75; Beaumont 
1997: 369). Due to these restrictions on water use at the West bank, a large proportion of the 
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water falling here penetrates the ground and then flows westwards into Israel where it can be 
captured and used (Beaumont 1997: 369; Homer-Dixon 1999: 75). It is also worth mentioning 
that despite Israeli restriction on West Bankers’ water use, the Palestinians living here have 
on several occasions and to the annoyance of Israeli authorities drilled wells for which they 
did not have permission. 
 
At the end of his career, Meir Ben Meir, Israel's Water Commissioner from 1981-1991, 
emphasized the possibility of conflict over water between Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan and 
Syria. "At the moment, I project the scarcity of water within 5 years," he said before his 
retirement in ’91. "I can promise that if there is not sufficient water in our region, if there is 
scarcity of water, if people remain thirsty for water, then we shall doubtlessly face war."  
 
Demographic changes and the consequences of these on the patterns of water consumption 
are factors putting further stress on the water situation in Jordan, Israel and the oPt. A rapid 
increase in population in all three countries and a marked expansion of Israeli irrigated area 
since 1949 has increased water demands immensely.  
 
Israeli “water piracy”, the Palestinian’s “illegal” drilling of wells, population growth and 
changed patterns of water consumption along with the long term political instability in the 
region are factors indicating that if there is one region in the world that should be at the brink 
of a water war, it is the Middle East. Not only does the region already suffer from water 
scarcity, the situation is expected to worsen in the near future. The general level of tension in 
the region is high, and state leaders do not seem to have second thoughts about going to war 
against each other.  
 
The current situation with the shared freshwater water resources of Jordan, Israel and the oPt 
seems to fit quite well with Thomas Homer-Dixon’s “conditions for conflict over water” 
(described in section 2.2.2). In the case of Jordan-Israel and the Jordan River, Jordan which is 
the downstream country, is highly dependent on the water in the river for its national well-
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being. Israel is substantially preventing the river’s flow, and there is a history of antagonism 
between the two countries, at least until the peace agreement in 1994. The only point where 
Jordan and Israel do not fit well with the conditions is the point that states that the 
downstream country “must believe it is military stronger than the upstream country”. It is 
evident to both parties that Israel is the militarily stronger riparian.  
 
The case of Israel-PA however seems to fit even more perfectly with Homer-Dixons 
conditions if we, like Beaumont (1997), consider the groundwater in an upstream/downstream 
perspective. Israel which is then the downstream country is highly dependent on the 
groundwater for its national well-being. Palestinians have, as previously mentioned, during 
the last couple of years been drilling wells “illegally” to get access to additional water 
sources. It is also a known problem that the PA has severe sewage problems in the West 
Bank, and that the groundwater is being polluted. The upstream country is thus restricting, or 
at least potentially restricting the downstream country’s access to water. And lastly, the 
downstream country (Israel) knows that it is military stronger than the upstream country (the 
PA). According to Homer-Dixon’s conditions a water-conflict should be right around the 
corner.     
 
2.3.1 The Strategies of International Institutions 
The many warnings from central figures in Middle Eastern politics, as well as the research 
endeavors in the field of Environmental Security seem to have had a significant influence on 
policy strategies for many western countries, as well as for international organizations such as 
the United Nations, NATO, the EU and in non-governmental organizations such as the World 
Conservation Union and Greenpeace (Barnett 2007: 183).   
 
The Obama Administration included measures against the consequences of climate change in 
their Security Strategy for 2010. The report describes the danger from climate change as “real, 
urgent, and severe”:  
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The change brought by a warming planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and resources; new 
suffering from drought and famine; catastrophic natural disasters; and the degradation of land across the 
globe. The United States will therefore confront climate change based upon clear guidance from the 
science, and in cooperation with all nations—for there is no effective solution to climate change that 
does not depend upon all nations taking responsibility for their own actions and for the planet we will 
leave behind (White House 2010 : 47). 
 
In a 2011 report for the International Union for Conservation of Nature we could read that:  
 
Climate change will increasingly cause storms, droughts, floods and fires and have a severe impact on 
food production, water availability and ecosystems such as forests and wetlands. A major concern is 
how rapid climate change will magnify existing environmental stresses and contribute to food 
insecurity, conflict over resources, and loss of livelihood for millions of people (IUCN 2011). 
 
 
The EU has developed directives on how to respond to the security threats that climate change 
represents, and is more specific with regards to the actual concerns of the Union related to 
climate changes. In a paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to 
the European Council entitled “Climate Change and International Security” (2008), climate 
change is described as “a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and 
instability:  
 
The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already 
fragile and conflict prone. It is important to recognize that the risks are not just of a humanitarian 
nature; they also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests.  
 
The report states that climate change should be considered a security issue because it 
potentially fuels a number of threats, including conflict over resources, economic damage and 
risks to coastal cities and critical infrastructure, loss of territory and border disputes, 
environmentally-induced migration, situations of fragility and radicalization, tension over 
energy supply and pressure on international governance. All of these consequences should be 
considered security issues for the EU since the Union’s neighbors include “some of the most 
vulnerable regions to climate change, e.g. North Africa and the Middle East”. Hence, 
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migratory pressure at the European Union’s borders, political instability, and conflicts could 
increase in the future (European Commission 2008: 6).  
 
The EU report is the one that most clearly states the actual threats that Union member 
countries are expected to face – notably border pressure from “environmental migrants”. 
North Africa and the Middle East is pointed out as a region especially vulnerable to climate 
change, and the conviction that the consequences of climate change in the Middle East will be 
political instability and conflict seems omnipresent. More recent research however, 
contradicts these assumptions.  
  
2.4 The Facts of the Matter and the Research 
Question 
War over water in the Middle East has been predicted for almost 40 years both by prominent 
political actors and researchers. Warnings have been issued, and both national and 
international institutions seem to have been preparing themselves for the outbreak for such a 
war for several years now. However, no war over water has yet occurred. Not in the Middle 
East and not anywhere else (Beaumont 1997: 356; Wolf 1998; Yoffe & Wolf 1999; Alam 
2002; Waterbury 2001; Priscoli & Wolf 2009: 11).  
 
According to Priscoli and Wolf (2009: 11) a close examination of the cases cited as historic 
interstate water conflicts shows that there are methodological problems encumbering the 
results. The problems are notably related to a “looseness of classification” and “paucity of 
evidence”. Only seven minor skirmishes have actually been waged over international waters 
in modern history (Priscoli & Wolf 2009: 11). No country has yet gone to war solely over 
water (Beaumont 1997: 356). Conversely, over 3600 treaties have been signed over different 
aspects of international waters, “many showing tremendous elegance and creativity for 
dealing with this critical resource” (Wolf & Hamner 2000: 123). Accordingly, war over water 
is “neither strategically rational, hydrographically effective, nor economically viable” (Wolf 
& Hamner 2000: 123). Shared interest along a water-way seem to overwhelm waters’ 
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conflict-inducing characteristics, and once water management institutions are in place they 
tend to induce cooperation and incite violence only in the exception (Wolf and Hamner 2000: 
123, Bernauer and Kalbhenn 2010).  
 
Priscoli and Wolf (2009: 14) also highlight the fact that “the historical evidence record shows 
that international water disputes do get resolved, even among bitter enemies, and even as 
conflicts erupt over other issues. Some of the most vociferous enemies around the world have 
negotiated water agreements or are in the process of doing so”.  
 
Quantitative studies of resource and environmental issues indicate that these do seem to play a role in 
interstate as well as in intrastate conflict. However, the influence of such variables is less dramatic than 
frequently assumed in the political debate, it is mediated by other factors, and it may even at times have 
the opposite effect of what the environmental literature posits – abundance leading to fighting, scarcity 
to cooperation (Gleditsch & Diehl 2001: 257).  
    
Today it seems as if few if any scientists point to water or natural resource scarcity as a direct 
cause of conflict. In spite of the gloomy predictions about the coming wars in water-poor 
regions, no major ‘water war’ has yet occurred. Although 28 per cent of tensions over water 
were conflictive, no formal declaration of war over water has been made, according to 
research by the University of Oregon. This empirical evidence is rather contradictory to the 
pessimistic prediction of the eruption of water wars in the Middle East. These “facts of the 
matter” lead us to the overarching research question:  
 
 
 
 
If the conditions for conflict are fulfilled, how can we explain the absence of war over water in 
the Middle East? 
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2.5 The Water Non-conflict Approach: Trade, Treaty 
and Technology 
The lack of empirical evidence to support the water war-thesis has led researchers to look in 
different directions for explanations. Some have found that liberal ideas (e.g. the ideas of 
Haas et al. 1993) are more apt for explaining the “missing water wars”. In the following 
sections I present the works of different writers within the water non-conflict approach. These 
can be divided according to their main explanatory factor for the absence of war: trade, treaty 
and technology.  
 
2.5.1 Trade 
The idea that peace is a positive externality of global commerce is not a recent one. 
Montesquieu, Kant and Wilson are some of the historical figures who have presented this 
argument (Montesquieu 1995; Kant 1970; Gartzke et al. 2001: 391). Haas et al. (1993) argue 
that the anarchic characteristic of the international society does not necessarily imply conflict 
between states; states actually prefer cooperation to conflict. The main reason for this is that 
globalization has made “economic interdependence11
 
” an intrinsic feature of international 
relations. Interdependence both raises the economic interest countries have in continuing 
peaceful exchange and provides a medium of communication that can be useful in preventing 
or resolving disagreements short of violence (Russett & Oneal 2001: 139). The intertwined 
global economic system gives each party a stake in the economic well-being of the other and 
the cost of war renders it anachronistic (Russett & Oneal 2001: 129). 
Countries that are interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the global economy, whether 
democratic or not, have an important basis for pacific relations and conflict resolution (Russett & Oneal 
2001: 155).  
 
                                                 
11 According to Keohane & Nye (1973: 160) interdependence can be defined on the process level as ”mutal 
sensitivity: i.e. the extent to which change in one state affects change in others”.  
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Russett & Oneal have conducted aggregated analysis on trade’s effect on conflict and found 
strong support for the assumption that economically important trade significantly constrains 
the use of force. 
 
Countries that are interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the global economy, whether 
democratic or not, have and important basis for pacific relations and conflict resolution (Russett & 
Oneal 2001: 155).  
 
They also found that the pacific benefits of trade are not reduced by asymmetric economic 
relations (Rusett & Oneal 2001: 154). Gartzke et al. (2001: 418) adds that the multiple 
channels of economic interactions help states to communicate in a credible manner, these 
multiple channels increase the “vocabulary” available to states in attempting to assess relative 
resolve. When states fail to cooperate, this is often due to misunderstandings and 
misperceptions. States are “rational egoists” and will cooperate if they have a mutual interest 
in doing so. Through cooperation, states will seek to maximize absolute gains. States are less 
concerned with gains or advantages achieved by other states in cooperative agreements.  
 
2.5.2 Treaty 
Haas et al. (1993) also claim that environmental institutions can promote changes in national 
policies and encourage both national and international policies, which address environmental 
problems. Institutions are seen as persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that 
prescribe roles, constrain activity and shape the expectations of actors. International regimes 
and institutions do not enforce the rules in a hierarchical manner, but they do change patterns 
of transaction costs and provide information to participants, so that uncertainty is reduced. 
Institutions may include organizations, bureaucratic agencies, treaties and agreements, and 
informal practices that states accept as binding (Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 250, Lamy 2005: 
214). Most importantly for the discussion on cooperation and negotiation related to 
transboundary water agreements, neoliberal institutionalists contend that it is the prospect of 
cheating, which provokes curtailment of cooperation. However, cheating may be mitigated 
and cooperation facilitated, depending on the institutional arrangements among the states 
(Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 250, Lamy 2005: 213, Zacher & Matthew 1995: 118). 
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In an article reviewing the international conflict level from 1948-2006, Gleditsch (2008) 
shows that there was a peak of armed violence in the middle of the 20th century, but that war 
and armed conflict are a phenomena that since has been on the decline. Since the 1990s the 
international conflict level has stabilized on an all-time low level. Gleditsch explains this by 
the change in international institutions and norms in recent history.  
 
We have lived through a particularly lethal combination of the old perception of war as a useful 
instrument of policy with the modern technological capacity to wage war effectively. Our technological 
skills have continued to improve, so we could kill each other many times over if we applied the full 
range of human ingenuity to that task. A single direct nuclear exchange between the two superpowers 
would have changed the picture dramatically and created a more recent and higher peak of severity. If 
we do not kill each other at such a rate, it is because our institutions and attitudes have changed 
(Gleditsch 2008: 698).  
 
Within the neoliberal camp, arguing that cooperation is the norm and conflict is the anomaly, 
we find the work of Shlomi Dinar (2008). Dinar has developed a comprehensive theory 
related to international river treaty negotiation. He claims that the neo-realist approaches to 
hydro-politics over shared water resources are incorrect, and argues that the geography of a 
river as well as the relative power of the neighboring states provide the background for 
understanding the prerequisites for cooperation, but he also claims that there are a number of 
other factors that influence the potential for cooperation. Most importantly he argues that the 
way that the shared water resources are dealt with depends not on hegemony, but on voluntary 
contracting among states (2008: 16).  
 
According to Dinar, the geography and power-related considerations need to be linked to 
reciprocity, issue-linkage and side-payments. Dinar calls this “the building blocks of strategic 
interaction” (2008: 16). Side-payments repaying for the benefits that the upstream state 
creates in favour of the downstream state can provide an important incentive to cooperation, 
as it contributes to balancing the geographically asymmetric relationship between an upstream 
and a downstream state (2008: 26).  
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Strategic interaction includes elements of reciprocity and issue-linkage. Countries that share 
more than one river may be upstream on some rivers yet downstream on others. In this case, 
countries may not wish to exploit their strategic location on the first river to the detriment of 
the other state, setting precedent for the other state to act in the same manner on the second 
river where it is more strategically located (Dinar 2008: 22). 
 
Furthermore, he lists a number of other factors that have a facilitating effect on cooperation 
over water scarcity issues. Transnational organizations and nongovernmental organizations 
play an instrumental role in facilitating cooperation and international agreements because they 
help persuade the parties that cooperation is a win-win situation. They build consensus, define 
the negotiating agenda, and create a problem-solving atmosphere. And they may provide 
financial assistance that might make an agreement more attractive to by changing the payoffs 
for cooperation. “Epistemic communities” are knowledge based networks that are often 
consulted on technical issues that require expertise that regular politicians and diplomats do 
not have. Epistemic communities are able to exert influence on policy innovation, policy 
diffusion, policy selection, and policy persistence. By doing so, they play a role in creating 
norms, social realities, and perceptions among the policy makers. In turn nation states will 
exert power on behalf of the values and practices promoted by the epistemic community and 
will thus help in their international institutionalization (Dinar 2008: 29). Epistemic 
communities however, often depend on many exogenous variables, which challenge their 
roles in negotiations and constructing knowledge. For example, the role of ideas often 
becomes more salient and powerful at times of crisis. Epistemic communities become more 
relevant when policy makers seek advice from expert communities. Therefore it might 
actually be the crisis situation driving the cooperative outcome of negotiations, and not the 
epistemic communities (Dinar 2008: 29). Even when epistemic communities, or third-party 
organizations, take an active role in negotiations; it is their ability to provide side-payments or 
other incentives that makes otherwise recalcitrant parties want to cooperate (Dinar 2008: 30).  
 
31 
 
As empirical evidence seems to suggest that states cooperate over shared water resources 
more often than engaging in conflict, researchers have in recent years taken interest in finding 
the factors which seem to induce such cooperation through aggregated analysis.  
 
Song and Whittington’s (2004) main findings are that international rivers with riparians that 
have countervailing economic and political power are far more likely to have negotiated 
treaties than other river types. Riparian states on international rivers sharing a “western 
civilization” were much more likely to have concluded treaties than riparian states on rivers in 
other civilizations. Rivers that cross “civilization boundaries” appear no less likely to have 
treaties than international rivers that run entirely through riparian states that share a single 
civilization. Espey and Towfique also published a quantitative analysis of bilateral water 
treaties in 2004. They attempted to determine the factors that have influenced the formation of 
bilateral international water treaties over the last 60 years (Espey and Towfique 2004: 1). 
They tested a set of hydrological, geographical, socioeconomic, political and cultural factors, 
and found that the larger a water basin is as a percent of a country’s size, the more likely the 
country is to form a treaty regarding its management. Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth (2008) 
found that international institutions tend to promote the effective mediation and settlement of 
territorial, maritime and river claims.  While Brochmann & Hensel (2009) argue that the value 
of a given river to the countries sharing it is an important predictor of states negotiating 
behavior, and that water availability is the key to interaction over rivers. Low access will 
increase competition over the limited resource and disagreements are likely to occur – but this 
is the situation where states are most likely to enter into negotiations to solve the 
disagreements (Brochmann & Hensel 2009: 414). Tir & Stinnett (2011: 20) conclude their 
analysis by stating that treaties that address especially difficult river use issues, such as water 
quantity and navigation, are most likely to contain provisions for institutional governance.   
 
All these aggregated analyses point in the same direction in their conclusion; when the river 
basin is crucial to the involved parties, e.g. because of resource scarcity or pollution, the 
parties themselves as well as other institutions that might be involved tend to put more efforts 
into solving disagreements, this results in highly institutionalized solutions such as high 
persistence treaties.   
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2.5.3 Technology  
Some writers within the water non-conflict approach have taken the position of strongly 
questioning the base argument used to predict conflict over environmental issues or scarce 
resources. These writers claim that discussing the consequences of water scarcity is irrelevant 
because it ignores human inventiveness and technological change (Gleditsch & Diehl 2001: 
253). Cornucopian theory, as formulated by Simon (1981), Deudney (1991) and Lomborg 
(2001) acknowledges that greater consumption is due to an increase in population, which 
heightens scarcity and induces price increases in the short run. Higher prices then create an 
opportunity, which leads inventors and businesses to seek new ways to satisfy the shortages. 
A few inventors and businesses eventually succeed, and finally society ends up better off than 
if the original shortage problems had never arisen. As population grows, the stock of useful 
knowledge grows as well. At the baseline of the Cornucopian approach lies both an optimistic 
view of the environmental situation, as well as of human nature itself.  
 
The Cornucopians also take their assumptions one step further arguing that modern industry 
produces highly processed goods, which require intensive use of capital, technology and 
energy rather than raw materials. Another factor they put forward as an argument is that one 
should not overlook the role of international trade, as most scarcities are local rather than 
universal (Gleditsch & Diehl 2001: 253).   
 
2.6 Hypotheses 
To summarize the theoretical debate on resource scarcity and the potential for war over water 
one can say that the writers within the Environmental Security tradition have, although based 
on different arguments, been predicting war over water to break out for several decades. The 
Political Ecologists claimed that disruptions in the world’s ecosystems would eventually 
cause conflicts to erupt because the collapse of ecosystems eventually leads to the collapse of 
societies. The Neo-Malthusians have generally focused more on intrastate conflict caused by 
competition among groups in society to gain control over scarce resources. An assessment of 
the situation of water scarcity in Jordan, Israel and oPt shows that according to the pessimistic 
predictions of Homer-Dixon, these countries should be at the brink of war. The fact that no 
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war over water has actually occurred has made neo-liberal approaches gain strength in 
explaining the outcomes of resource scarcity. The Neo-Liberals’ explanations for the absence 
of war over water focus on three factors: Trade, Treaty and Technology. Recent years’ 
aggregated analyses have shown that cooperation is a more probable result of water scarcity 
than war, and that it is generally when the water resources have high value to the involved 
parties that treaties with efficient solutions for allocation are negotiated. Still, an explanation 
for why no war over water has yet occurred in the Middle East is a question which has not 
been properly addressed. Two main hypotheses12
 
 can be deduced as possible explanations for 
this absence of war:   
 
 
The first hypothetical explanation, H1, is based on the neo-realist assumption that water is a 
“low politics” issue, an issue which is not salient enough to be considered critical for state 
survival. The second hypothetical explanation, H2, is based on the neo-liberal assumption that 
states seek cooperation when it is in their mutual interest to do so. Realizing that water is a 
critical resource and that cooperation is the best way of solving issues related to water 
scarcity, states will seek to establish common water regimes.  
 
Chapter 4 “Analysis” addresses these hypotheses. Based on interview data collected in 
December 2010, and different written sources, such as evaluation reports (by third parties) 
and scientific articles, I will attempt to establish which of the hypothetical explanations is 
more in line with the empirical evidence.   
                                                 
12 I wish to emphasize that even though I use hypotheses to guide my analysis of the empirical data, this does not 
imply that the study is meant to be a straight-forward confirmatory/disconfirmatory one. The goal is to establish 
insight into the causal mechanisms that can explain the absence of war (see also Chapter 3 Methodological 
Approach for a discussion of these issues). As emphasized in section 1.3 the study is also not meant to be an 
exhaustive evaluation of all possible explanations for the absence of war over water, focus is on central theories 
within the field of International Relations.  
H1: Water is not a sufficiently important issue to go to war over in a region where high politics 
dominate.  
H2: Water is a resource which is fundamentally too important for people’s survival to go to war 
over. 
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3. Methodological Approach 
“Even more important than choosing a good method is being careful to record and report whatever 
method was used and all the information necessary for someone else to apply it” (King et al. 1994: 23).  
 
Multilateral cooperation on water is a complex social phenomenon both in theory and in 
practice. According to Yin (2009: 4) the desire to understand such complex phenomena has 
created a need for case studies. The virtue of the case study, as practitioners of the method 
point out, is the depth of analysis that is offers, along with insight into causal mechanisms 
(Gerring 2007: 49). The base argument for the choice of case study as method in this research 
paper follows the same logic; notably that a case study will provide insight into the factors 
that the key actors themselves consider important for explaining the absence of war over 
water in the Middle East.  
 
In the following I shortly present the main affinities and inconveniences linked to the 
qualitative case study as a method relevant to my research question. I also present a 
discussion on why the case under study can be argued to represent the Middle East as a 
region, before I proceed to discussing the pros and cons of method triangulation with 
interviews and content analysis for this research project. I conclude the chapter with a note on 
the validity and the reliability of the study.  
 
3.1 The Case Study as Method: A Note on Its 
Affinities and Inconveniences  
A key methodological lesson is that “the research question determines the method” (Gerring 
2007: 71). In this case, the research question “How can we explain the absence of war over 
water in the Middle East?” is a “how” question. A “how” or “why” research question implies 
that one is dealing with an explanatory research project, which is likely to lead to the use of 
case studies as the preferred research method (Yin 2009: 9). This is because such questions 
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deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or 
incidence. If you want to know “how” or “why” something happens, you will have to draw 
upon a wider array of documentary information, in addition to conducting interviews (Yin 
2009: 19). In-depth studies are also known to have contributed to some of the most important 
theoretical insights in the social sciences; the theory of the iron law of Oligarchy13
 
 being the 
most famous example of this (Gerring 2007: 109). 
Qualitative research is often seen as a preliminary, exploratory effort to quantitative research 
since quantitative research is by many viewed as the only type that yields rigorously verified 
findings and hypotheses (Gerring 2007: 40-41). But qualitative research should also be 
scrutinized for its usefulness in the discovery of substantive theory – the formulation of 
concepts and their interrelation into a set of hypotheses for a given substantive area. 
Qualitative research is often the most adequate and efficient method for obtaining the type of 
information required and for contending with the difficulties of an empirical research situation 
(Glaser and Strauss 1971: 288).    
 
The choice of methodological design has consequences for the validity of the inferences that 
one makes from analysis (Lund 2002: 97). The inferences made in case studies can generally 
not be said to have statistical validity or validity beyond the case in focus. Adherents of 
statistical analysis have expressed doubts about the case study method’s usefulness for 
general knowledge development. Case study researchers however, have countered this 
critique by explaining that “[a] case study may be understood as the intensive study of a 
single case where the purpose of that study – at least in part – is to shed light on a larger class 
of cases (a population)” (Gerring 2007: 20). The key to doing a fruitful case study is therefore 
to choose a case or a few cases that somehow can be argued to represent a broader scope of 
cases. A discussion of the case selection in this research project follows in the next sections.  
 
 
                                                 
13 “The Iron Law of Oligarchy” is a theory developed by Roberto Michels stating that all forms of organizations 
will eventually and inevitably develop into oligarchies (Michels 1911; Scaff 1981).   
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3.2 Case Selection and Representativeness  
If the research question is posed in such a way that it covers a more comprehensive set of 
units than the actual empirical data does, it is important to select units that can be said to 
represent a broader number of cases (Lund 2002: 91-92).  In a qualitative case study, 
reporting the precise rules by which we choose the small number of cases for analysis is 
critical (King et al. 1994: 23). Several reasons why Jordan, Israel and the PA together 
constitute a good basis for saying something general about the absence of war over water in 
the Middle East can be pointed out14
 
.  
The Middle East is considered the world’s most water-scarce region and in many places 
demand for water outstrips supply15
                                                 
14 Although some might argue that Israel-Syria or Israel-Lebanon are just as interesting or just as representative 
for the region as Israel-Jordan or Israel-PA, I have chosen to not include these in the analysis as Syria and 
Lebanon currently are not per definition suffering from water scarcity. Syria currently has access to 1,541 m³ per 
person per year, and Lebanon 1,220 m³, both are thus above the UN threshold of 1000 m³ per person per year 
(Boko et al. 2007)    
. Climate models are now prognosticating an even hotter, 
drier and less predictable climate in the region. Higher temperatures and less rainfall will 
reduce the flow of rivers and streams, slow the rate at which aquifers recharge, progressively 
raise sea levels and make the entire region more arid (Brown & Crawford 2009: 2). Every 
state in the Jordan River basin is well below the global average of water availability 
(Engelman & LeRoy 1993; Brown & Crawford 2009: 12), but Jordan and Palestine are the 
most stressed riparians on the Jordan River. Most of the water (both rivers and aquifers) 
shared by the three entities Jordan, Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories is 
transboundary (Beaumont 2000: 19).  Some traits that are common for all three countries, 
which indicate why they are interesting study objects, can be described. The populations in 
the three countries have limited access to fresh water resources. In Israel they have 265 m³, in 
the oPt they have 90 m³ and in Jordan they have 169 m³ per person per year (Raphaeli 2007). 
This means that all three fall below the UN threshold of 1000 cubic metres per person per 
year. As shown by the maps in chapter 1, all three countries share freshwater resources either 
through the Jordan River Basin (Israel and Jordan), or through freshwater aquifers (Israel-
oPt). In addition to being the world’s most water scarce region, it is also the world’s 
“youngest” region. All three countries are experiencing rapid demographic changes and 
15 The Middle East and North Africa (the MENA region) is considered the world’s most water scarce region 
(Boko et al. 2007).  
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population growth, which is expected to inflict on the patterns on water consumption in the 
near future. The young population is both a cause and a consequence of this rapid population 
growth (Brown & Crawford 2009: 10). The population of the oPt is expected to increase by 
46% during the period 2008-2050, in Jordan increase for this period is expected to be 37% 
and for Israel 28% (UNFPA 2008). It is also expected that climate change will affect 
freshwater access substantially in all three countries, mainly through longer and more 
frequent drought periods (Brown & Crawford 2009: 11).  A summary of these common traits 
with regards to water resources follows in box 3.2.1.  
 
 
 
A fruitful approach is to study these three countries as cases of bilateral relations. I have 
excluded the case of Jordan-PA from the analysis because this pair shares few freshwater 
resources (only the lower parts of the Jordan River), and does not have a history of conflictual 
water relations. We are thus facing three countries which will be treated as two cases of 
bilateral relations. In the following sections I summarize the main reasons why the two cases 
of bilateral relations (Israel-PA and Israel-Jordan) can be said to be representative for the 
region in general (ref. to section 2.3 where some of these arguments are also mentioned).  
 
3.2.1 Israel and the PA 
Israel’s political relations with its neighbors are generally either tense (i.e. with Turkey) or 
non-existent (i.e. with Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran). But the fact that Israel is 
de facto occupying the Palestinian territories makes the PA the authority that has the highest 
potential of all of Israel’s neighbors of engaging in high tension conflict or war with Israeli 
Box 3.2.1 Freshwater access in Jordan, Israel and the oPt 
• All three countries suffer from water scarcity.  
• The water resources in all three countries have a transboundary characteristic. 
• All three countries are experiencing rapid demographic changes, and changes in water consumption 
patterns.  
• Climate change is expected to impact negatively on the access to freshwater resources.  
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Authorities. Not because the PA are interested in war with Israel, but because Israel 
practically has no incentive to avoid retaliation when they feel that their interests are being 
“stepped on” either by the PA or the Palestinian population. The conflict between Israel and 
the Palestinians is also one of the longest lasting conflicts in modern history, including high 
tension periods like the first and the second intifada. This indicates that relations between 
Israeli Authorities and the PA can be considered as a case of bilateral relations where the 
possibility of finding peaceful solutions to common problems is very low. As mentioned in 
chapter 2 (section 2.3) the case of Israel-PA also fits smoothly with Homer-Dixon’s 
conditions for conflict16
 
. Box 3.2.1.1 summarizes the bilateral relations of interest between 
Israel and the PA.  
 
 
Israel is also important to include in the analysis because of its modern economy and western 
living standards. The country exhibits a level and pattern of water demand that is currently 
atypical to the region. There is hardly a country in the region, however, that is not 
experiencing alarming growth in its demand for water, and few are instituting significant 
construction programs. Consequently one can assume that technological solutions for water 
problems established by Israel will set the example to follow for other Middle Eastern 
countries (Lonergan & Brooks 1994: 7).  
 
                                                 
16 Ref. to section 2.2.2 where these conditions are outlined.  
Box 3.2.1.1 Bilateral relations Israel-PA 
• The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is one of the longest lasting conflicts in modern 
history.  
• The tense relationship between the two authorities has on several occasions developed into a 
warlike state (i.e. during the two intifadas).  
• Israel and the PA rely on common groundwater aquifers for freshwater supply.  
• The case of Israel and the PA fits perfectly with Homer-Dixon’s conditions for conflict. 
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A great number of disputes17
 
 over water in the Middle East include Israel, on one hand 
because of the country’s geographical location bordering several other countries in the region 
as well as transboundary aquifers and rivers, and on the other hand because of the country’s 
dominant military position in the region. Understanding Israel’s behaviour with regards to 
water related issues seems to be a key factor for understanding water cooperation in the 
region.  
The Palestinian Territories are considered occupied territory (under Israeli occupation), and 
one might argue that it is not appropriate to label relations between the two entities 
“bilateral”. The fact of the matter however remains that the right of the Palestinian people to 
self-determination, national independence, and sovereignty was recognized by the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 in 1974, and since the establishment of the 
Palestinian National Authority following the Oslo Accords in 1994, negotiations between the 
two parties (Israel and the PA) have been functioning bilaterally as negotiations between two 
governments. Represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestine has become 
signatory to a number of regional Middle East Agreements, including the Regional 
Convention for the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment (Barrett 
2003: 154).  The PA was established through the Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles 
on Interim Self Government (DoP) signed between the PLO and the Government of Israel on 
13th September, 2003. Although the PA is essentially an interim administrative organization 
that nominally governs parts of the West Bank and Gaza, it has the institutional character of a 
state, with a legislative arm (The Palestinian Legislative Council, or the PLC) and an 
executive (the Cabinet). There is also a nominally independent judiciary. The PA also has 
bilateral relations18
 
 with most countries in the world, hence having the structure and the 
functions an independent state.  
 
                                                 
17 Out of the 169 negative (score between -1 and -6) water related incidents registered for the Jordan River Basin 
between 1951 and 1998, Israel was involved in 150 (Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database 2011).  
18 117 countries have recognized the Palestinian people’s right to self determination (list provided on request 
from the Palestinian Delegation to Norway).  
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3.2.2 Israel and Jordan 
The pair of Jordan-Israel also meets several of Homer-Dixon’s “conditions for conflict”. The 
pair however deviates on the condition that Homer-Dixon lists as “maybe the most important 
factor” – notably that the downstream country should believe that it is militarily stronger than 
the upstream country. Jordanian Authorities are well aware that they do not have the military 
capacities of Israel. Despite several years of tension between the two countries with regards to 
issues related to the Jordan River, Jordan and Israel with the diplomatic assistance of the US 
where able to reach a peace agreement in 1994, where several important water allocation 
issues were addressed. Jordan is the only other country in the Middle East apart from Egypt 
that has signed a peace agreement with Israel19. Having interacted in friendly terms for almost 
2020
 
 years makes the pair of Jordan-Israel a case where the potential for conflict is 
comparably low to the case of Israel-PA. Box 3.2.2.1 summarizes the bilateral relations of 
interest between Israel and Jordan. 
 
 
3.2.3 The Case in Study Summarized  
With the inclusion of the two pairs of bilateral relations, Israel-PA and Israel-Jordan, we have 
a case study that includes two cases of bilateral relations situated on both ends of a “potential 
for conflict scale”. With Israel-PA the potential for conflict over basically any issue is high, 
while with Israel-Jordan the potential for conflict over any issue should be considered 
relatively low due to the peace treaty. The two cases selected for the study can thus be said to 
                                                 
19 The validity of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt is currently subject to discussion due to the 
recent events in Egypt (popular revolt followed by Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011). 
20 From 1994-2007 the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data has registered only 1 conflict between Jordan and 
Israel (No. 4274 in 1998) which is listed with 0 fatalities (Correlates of War 2007).  
Box 3.2.2.1 Bilateral relations Israel-Jordan  
• Israel and Jordan have had a history of conflictual political relations, and water issues were a 
central part of the conflict.  
• The two countries however signed a peace agreement in 1994, and have since this had stable 
political relations.  
• Israel and Jordan are both dependent on the waters in the Jordan River for freshwater supply.  
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represent “typical” cases or “least likely/most likely” cases for cooperation and conflict in the 
Middle East. Arguing that the cases represent a “most likely” case of conflict (Israel-PA) and 
a “least likely” case of conflict (Israel-Jordan) does not imply the use of any specific method 
such as a crucial case test21
 
 to confirm or disconfirm theory. This argument is merely 
presented to show that the selection of cases ensures the broadest possible reach of the causal 
propositions resulting from the study (Gerring 2007: 49).     
Israel-Jordan represents a case of an already established treaty, while between Israel and the 
PA there still has been no signing of a water treaty. This means that we have variation on the 
independent variable characterizing the political relationship between the parties. Although 
some writers22
 
 profess that variation on the dependent variable is the only viable method for 
case selection, this is not an option when one is attempting to explain the absence of a certain 
outcome on this dependent variable.    
Lonergan (2000: 45) argues that when analyzing the relationship between water scarcity and 
conflict in the Middle East, it is important to keep in mind that it cannot be reduced to a 
simple cause and effect relationship, since it is part of an intrinsic system of linkages. In 
Chapter 4, I take a deeper look into this system of linkages and attempt to find the 
mechanisms which can explain the absence of war over water, keeping the different 
theoretical approaches on the field in mind as a means of classifying findings.   
 
3.3 Testing the Hypotheses by Method Triangulation 
A hypothesis is a declarative sentence stating expected relationships between the phenomena 
to which our concepts refer (Yin 2009: 96). In order to address the research question and the 
hypotheses in focus for this study, I have used different methods of data collection. 
Triangulation in data collection is one of the advantages with the case study approach, and is 
often a necessary component of focused studies (Yin 2009:97). Method triangulation 
                                                 
21 See Gerring 2007:115 for an explanation of the crucial case test as method for qualitative analysis.   
22 See for example Geddes 2003: 94.  
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generally strengthens the validity of inferences because multiple sources of empirical 
evidence are consulted; each conclusion made is corroborated by multiple sources of evidence 
(Lund 2002: 86). In this research project I have attempted to achieve a triangulation by 
comparing the views expressed by high officials of the Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian 
water authorities, with documents such as the Nordic Consulting Group’s “Evaluation of 
CESAR’s Activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway” (2004), and other scientific 
documents and evaluation reports (written by third parties) on the water situation in the three 
countries.  
 
3.3.1 Qualitative Interviews 
In order to address the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 I conducted interviews with high 
officials (key informants) from the Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian Governments. In 
December 2010 I carried out interviews with Professor Uri Shani, Head of the Israeli Water 
Authority, Doctor Shaddad al-Attili, Head of the PA’s Water Authority, and Mrs. Maysoon 
al-Zoubi, Deputy Minister at the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation. According to 
Andersen (2006: 291) the active use of key informants should be seen in relation to the 
general research strategy. In my case I believe that the key informants’ opinions on the 
situation in the three countries are of high relevance not only because they are “experts on the 
field” but also because they have the authority to take or at least incite action on the issues in 
question.     
 
Interviewing is a special form of social interaction. An interview will often be characterized 
by tension and contradictions related to roles and role expectations. The interview situation 
and the relation between researcher and informant have an impact on the type of data that can 
be established (Yin 2009: 90). In this case the informants are not the units in the analysis; they 
are merely carrying information about the case/situation which I am aiming to establish 
knowledge about. The data collected through interviews is the key actors’ explanations of the 
interaction between Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian Authorities concerning water issues, the 
absence of a water war in the region, as well as explanations of the ongoing cooperation 
between the three countries.  
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The semi-structured interview technique I have used “increases the comprehensiveness of the 
data and makes data collection somewhat systematic for each respondent, logical gaps in data 
can be anticipated and closed” (Mikkelsen 2005:171; Aberbach & Rockman 2002: 674).  Yin 
(2009: 91) reminds us that when conducting such interviews it is important to understand the 
informants with regards to their own references. When conducting elite interviews, there are 
also a number of factors one should be aware of. These can mainly be summarized into saying 
that political elites are knowledgeable, often good speakers and that they might have their 
own agenda for the interview (Berry 2002: 679). As stated by Andersen (2006: 288) 
“believing that elite informants immediately will provide us with the truth is at best a naïve 
assumption”.  
 
Prior knowledge about the field of research however, opens up for method triangulation, 
which is considered to be an adequate way of counteracting the effects of “informant-bias”. 
The data collected through interviews is controlled against other sources of information (i.e. 
documents), which makes a sharper focus and a more critical evaluation of the interview data 
possible (Andersen 2006: 286). At the same time, the idea of using focused interviews as a 
method builds upon the assumption that it is possible to understand the social reality by 
listening to and interpreting what is said. From the point of view of the researcher, this means 
that one has the ability to interpret based on an analytical sensibility, and to see the theoretical 
in the empirical (Andersen 2006: 295).  
 
3.3.2 Content Analysis 
Krippendorf (1980:21) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making replicable 
and valid inferences from data to their context”. In any content analysis it must be clear which 
data are analyzed, and from which population they are drawn, and context relative to which 
data are analyzed must be made explicit (Krippendorf 1980: 23).  
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In this research project, the data object to content analysis is a collection of different types of 
textual documents; some can be considered “primary” sources and others “secondary”. 23
    
 The 
interview data, meeting minutes and reports from EXACT meetings can be categorized as 
primary documents, while the Nordic Consulting Group’s evaluation report is a secondary 
source of information. The documents studied in this research project are mainly used with 
the goal of either confirming or disconfirming assumptions made by the interview objects, as 
well as functioning as a supplement where the respondents’ objectives seem to be deficient. 
The documents also contribute with a more detailed contextual description of the case/cases 
under study. 
3.4 On the Validity and Reliability of the Study 
An essential part of the data collected for analysis was the interviews conducted with Israeli, 
Palestinian and Jordanian High Officials in December 2010. This means that important parts 
of the analysis are based on data constructed in an active interaction between two parties. This 
makes it especially relevant to address the issue of validity and reliability. Validity and 
reliability are essential issues when carrying out research projects. King et al. state that as 
researchers we should always “[m]aximize the validity of our measurements” and “[e]nsure 
that data-collection methods are reliable” (1994: 25).  
 
Validity refers to measuring what we think we are measuring. It is easiest to maximize 
validity by adhering to the data and not allowing unobserved or immeasurable concepts get in 
the way. According to Hellevik (1991: 103) the question of validity comes down to the extent 
to which the data material can say something relevant about the research question. Seeking 
multiple sources of testimony is an important strategy for ensuring the validity of a case 
study, and data triangulation is an important strategy in this respect. If different data sources 
lead to the same conclusion, the validity of the conclusions made is strengthened (Yin 2009: 
97). For my research project the question of validity is strongly related to the formulation of 
questions in the interview guide, as well as the interpretation of the respondent’s answers to 
                                                 
23 Primary and Secondary Sources : “primary sources constitute the basic, raw, imperfect evidence (...) while 
secondary sources are books and articles of other historians” (Marwik 1970 as cited in McCulloch 2004: 30).  
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these questions. In the analysis claims are generally based on arguments from multiple 
sources. However, in those few cases where a statement made by one of the interview objects 
is difficult to interpret I make sure to discuss the possible interpretations. During the 
interviews I also attempted to avoid such uncertainties by posing follow-up questions 
whenever I felt that the interview object was replying in an unclear manner or to the side of 
the question. Taking an active role during interviews provides analytical control and ensures 
the validity of interview data (Andersen 2006: 285). As mentioned in section 3.2, the case 
study’s strong point is internal validity (insight into causal mechanisms reduces the chance of 
making spurious inferences) rather than external validity (also known as statistical validity – 
that inferences can be said to be representative for a wider number of cases). By providing an 
interview guide with questions relevant to the research question, by probing and taking an 
active role during the interview, in addition to using method triangulation to ensure multiple 
sources of evidence I argue that the internal validity of this study is high. By providing 
thorough arguments for why the selected cases can be said to be representative for the region 
as a whole, I also argue that the external validity of the study is as high as can be for a case 
study.    
 
Reliability means that applying the same procedure in the same way will always produce the 
same measure. When a reliable procedure is applied at different times and nothing has 
happened in the meantime to change the “true” state of the object we are measuring, the same 
results will be observed (King et al. 1994: 25). “All data and analyses should, insofar as 
possible, be replicable”. (King et. al 1994: 26). Replicability applies not only to data, but to 
the entire reasoning process used in producing conclusions. On the basis of our research 
report, a new researcher should be able to duplicate our data and trace the logic by which we 
reached our conclusions. By reporting the study in sufficient detail, we ensure the possibility 
of evaluating the procedures followed and methods used (King et al. 1994: 26). In order to 
ensure the reliability of this study, I recorded all interviews with dictaphone and transcribed 
the content, which makes it possible to verify them. The documents used for content analysis 
are available to the public either online or in public libraries.    
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H1: Water is not a sufficiently important issue to go to war over in a region where high 
politics dominate. 
H2: Water is a resource which is fundamentally too important for people’s survival to go to 
war over. 
 
4. Analysis 
In chapter 2 “Theoretical Framework” I argued that there is a general agreement among 
researchers that water has never been the direct cause of war anywhere in the world, not even 
in the Middle East where the probability of such an outcome has been considered high. Two 
hypothetical explanations for this absence of war over water were presented in section 2.6: 
 
  
The first hypothesis is based on a realist argument that water is a “soft issue” and will never 
gain high enough priority on the political agenda to cause state leaders to go to war. The 
second hypothesis on the other hand, is based on the liberal assumption that states will 
cooperate to solve problems when this is in their common interest.  
 
By analyzing the political relations between the three Core Parties (Jordan, Israel and the PA) 
with regards to water issues, I will attempt to asses which of the hypothetical explanations 
finds the most support in the empirical material. Since the Madrid Conference was held in 
1991 to initiate “The Middle East Peace Process”, multilateral negotiations and talks on water 
issues have been dealt with under the umbrella of “The Multilateral Working Group on 
Water” (MWGW). The Working Group consists of representatives from the three Core 
Parties with the US as gavel holder, accompanied by representatives from donor parties to the 
cooperation such as EU, France and the Netherlands. The empirical evidence subject to 
analysis in this research project mainly stems from the discussions, talks and cooperation 
resulting from the meetings of the MWGW, as well as evaluation reports by independent 
institutions on the accomplishments of the MWGW.   
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In the following sections I provide a short presentation of the MWGW, as well as the Core 
Parties’ respective national water management institutions. I also present the representatives 
with which I have conducted interviews and their relation to the national water management 
institutions. In section 4.2 I present the evidence which indicates support of H1, while I in 
section 4.3 present the parts of the empirical evidence supporting H2. In section 4.4 I make 
the final inference as to which hypothesis finds the most support.  
 
4.1 The Multilateral Working Group on Water 
The Middle East Peace Process and its bilateral track began with the Madrid Conference of 
1991. The bilateral track was designed to concentrate on political issues that Israelis and 
Palestinians had inherited from the past, such as territorial control and sovereignty, border 
demarcations, security arrangements and the political rights of the Palestinians. A multilateral 
track was also established to focus on issues that could shape the future. The framework for 
the multilateral track was established in Moscow in 1992, and five multilateral working 
groups were set up. These were intended to examine a range of technically oriented issues that 
extend across national boundaries, the resolution of which is essential for long-term regional 
development, stability and security in the region. It was recognized that management and 
sharing of the scarce water resources is one of the main issues that needs to be resolved in 
order to obtain a sustainable and lasting solution to the Middle East conflict. The Multilateral 
Working Group on Water was thus one of the five groups24
  
 established to supplement and 
reinforce the bilateral track (NCG 2004: 49). The thinking behind the multilateral track was 
outlined by the U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in his remarks to the January 1992 
opening meeting of the multilaterals in Moscow: 
It is for this reason that we have come together – to address those issues that are common to the region 
and that do not necessarily respect national boundaries or geographic boundaries. These issues can be 
best addressed by the concerted efforts of the regional parties together with the support of the 
international community and the resources and expertise it can provide (Baker as quoted in Peters 1999: 
90).    
                                                 
24 The other four Working Groups established at the same time were: the Working Group on the Environment, 
the Working Group on Regional Economic Development, the Working Group on Refugees, and the Working 
Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.  
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The MWGW established the following four broad agenda items to address some of the critical 
water issues: 
● Enhancement of water data availability  
● Water management practices, including conservation 
● Enhancement of water supply 
● Concepts of regional water management and cooperation 
 
In the aim of addressing the “enhancement of water data availability” the Multilateral 
Working Group on Water Resources endorsed the Water Data Banks Project in November 
1994. The Water Data Banks Project consists of a series of specific actions to be taken by the 
Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians that are designed to foster the adoption of common, 
standardized data collection and storage techniques among the Parties, to improve the quality 
of the water resources data collected in the region, and to improve communication among the 
scientific community in the region. The project is managed by an Executive Action Team 
(EXACT), comprised of water experts from Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian water-
management agencies. Technical and financial support to EXACT is contributed by donor 
parties such as the European Union, France, The Netherlands, Norway and the United States. 
The Committee meets twice every year to plan, coordinate, and direct project implementation. 
In the following section I give a non-exhaustive presentation of some of the projects endorsed 
by the Working Group and the managing EXACT Committee.  
 
The approach of the multilaterals is grounded in the functionalist thesis of international 
relations which holds that engaging states in an ever-widening web of economic, technical 
and welfare interdependencies will force them to set aside their political and/or ideological 
rivalries and create a new perception of shared needs. It was hoped that developments on the 
multilateral level would serve as confidence-building measures that would then facilitate 
progress at the bilateral level – that is, that functional cooperation would eventually spill over 
into regional peace (Peters 1999: 90). Cooperation, it was hoped, would foster a fundamental 
change in attitude and lead to convergence of expectations and the institutionalization of 
behavior.  
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Box 4.1.1 Assessment of MWGW projects 
Atlas I, Water Resource Data for Decision Making in the Middle East 
The Water Atlas was one of the first MWGW projects and was seen as an opportunity to promote dialogue on 
management of shared water resources. A rationale for commissioning the Water Atlas was that the 
stakeholders held different information about their joint water resources with significant variation in quality 
between the parties. The stakeholders, moreover, recognized that the Palestinian Authority in contrast to the 
Israelis and the Jordanians, lacked detailed information about their water resources. The Water Atlas was 
intended to provide an unbiased source of information concerning the shared water resources of the three 
parties.  
The Regional Comparative Studies 
The Regional Comparative Studies on Water Laws, Water Institutions and Water Economics were produced in 
two volumes in two parallel processes; Volume I covering Israel, the PA and Jordan, and Volume II covering 
Lebanon and Syria. The separation of the processes was due to the fact that, politically, Syria and Lebanon did 
not want to be a part of a process involving Israel. Running the process in parallel was done as an attempt to 
bring the parties closer to a joint process and dialogue and the future. The rationale for undertaking the 
comparative regional study was “to allow the parties to have proper understanding about the other parties’ 
water resources and management which focused on the water laws, institutions and water supply and 
economics”.  
The Declaration of Principles 
The Declaration of Principles for Cooperation on Water-related Matters and New and Additional Water 
Resources (DOP) was signed by the three parties in 1996. According to representatives of the three parties, the 
DOP was a result of efforts by the political leadership of Norway that through CESAR1 strongly advocated the 
need to show tangible outputs from the MWGW process. As such they promoted the elaboration and signing of 
the DOP (just as other donors to the MWGW process advocated formal agreements/and or joint statements as 
outcome of projects they funded).  
The Waternet 
As part of the DOP, the parties agreed to cooperate on the development of new and additional water resources 
and other matters related to cooperation on water resources, including the “collection, filing, processing, 
transmission and exchange of water data and related information”. Subsequently, in 1996 the MWGW agreed 
to implement the Waternet Project. The Waternet Project was designed to enhance Middle East cooperation on 
water related issues through finding a technical solution for sharing information related to politically sensitive 
issues. The sharing of water data and related information was seen as essential for effective cooperation to take 
place on internationally shared resources. Asymmetry in information among the parties has been considered 
the main obstacle to water cooperation since the signing of the Oslo Accord.  
The Middle East Desalination Research Centre 
The Middle East Desalination Research Centre (MEDRC) was proposed by the government of Oman in 1994, 
endorsed by the MWGW and inaugurated in Muscat in December 1996. The United states, Oman, Japan, 
Israel, the European Union, and Korea contributed financial resources to fund its establishment and initial 
operation. The Centre’s mission is to conduct, facilitate, promote, coordinate, and support basic an applied 
research in water desalination and supporting fields.  
 
(Source: EXACT 2011; NCG 2004) 
In box 4.1.1 follows an assessment of MWGW projects relevant to this research paper.  
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Projects implemented by the MWGW on a national basis are not discussed here as they do not 
have any specific relevance to the research question. In the three following sections I give a 
brief presentation of the three Parties water managing institutions. This is to provide insight 
into how water resources are managed, as well as giving an indication of the interview 
objects’ roles in respective water management of the three countries.  
 
4.1.2 Israeli Regulation of Water Resources and the Director of the 
Water Authority  
The Minister of National Infrastructures is the Cabinet member responsible to the Parliament 
(the Knesset) for the management of water resources in Israel. Some aspects of the 
management, protection and allocation of water resources fall into the spheres of other 
ministries, and require their consent. This primarily concerns the Ministries of Agriculture, 
Environmental Protection, Health, Finance and the Interior. Following the 2006 amendment 
to the Israeli Water Law, many of these Ministries responsibilities with respect to the water 
sector were transferred to “the Council of the Governmental Authority of Water and 
Sewerage” (the Israeli Water Authority in short). The Council is an inter-agency body, headed 
by the Director of the Authority, and composed of senior representatives of the Ministries of 
Finance, National Infrastructures, Environmental Protection and Interior. The Director of the 
Water Authority is a cabinet appointed civil servant reporting to the Minister of National 
Infrastructures and to the Knesset (MNI, Israel 2011).  
 
Professor Uri Shani was appointed director of the Israeli Water Authority 6 December 2006, 
and is in charge of the Israeli water sector and the water related negotiations. As part of the 
data collection for this thesis I interviewed Prof. Shani in December 2010, succeeded by a 
follow-up telephone interview in May 2011.    
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4.1.3 Palestinian Regulation of Water Resources and the Minister of 
the PWA 
Upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) and the 1995 Interim Agreement, the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) inherited an extremely weak water sector characterized by serious 
institutional fragmentation. In 1995, the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) was established 
by a presidential decree. One year later, its functions, objectives and responsibilities were 
defined through a by-law, giving the PWA the mandate to manage water resources and 
execute the water policy. It was also made responsible for establishing cooperation and 
coordination between several stakeholders. Inadequate conditions in terms of water access 
and quality are however still common and the legal framework of the water managing 
institutions is in many cases unclear.  
 
General water sector policies are set by the Palestinian cabinet of ministries and the National 
Water Council. According to the Water Law No. 3, the NWC has the task to ratify policies, 
plans, and programs concerning water resources in Palestine. The council has the authority to 
suspend or dismantle the services of the board of directors of the regional water and 
wastewater services providers. The members of the council include the main Palestinian 
ministries and other relevant stakeholders like the PWA and the PA. 
 
The PWA acts as regulatory authority, responsible for the legislation, monitoring and human 
resources development in the sector. The PWA is also in charge of water resources and 
wastewater management. It has the mandate to carry out regular inspections and to keep a 
register of all water related data and information. Moreover, the authority shares 
responsibility for irrigation with the Ministry of Agriculture and for environmental protection 
with the Environment Quality Authority (PWA 2011).  
 
In 2008 Dr. Shaddad Al-Attili was appointed Minister of the PWA. Attili leads the permanent 
status negotiation on water with Israel, and is currently leading a Reform Plan for the water 
sector in Palestine. As part of the data collection for this thesis I interviewed Dr. Attili in 
December 2010. 
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4.1.4 Jordanian Regulation of Water Resources and the Secretary 
General of Water and Irrigation  
The Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) is the official body responsible for the overall 
monitoring of the water sector, water supply and wastewater system and related water projects 
in Jordan, this includes planning and management, the formulation of national water strategies 
and policies, research and development, information systems and procurement of financial 
resources. Its role also includes the provision of centralized water-related data, standardization 
and consolidation of data.  
 
The MWI was established by the Jordanian Government in 1988 in response to Jordan’s 
recognition of the need for a more integrated approach to national water management. Since 
its establishment, MWI has been supported by several donor organization projects that have 
assisted in the development of water policy and water master planning as well as restructuring 
the water sector (MWI 2011).  
 
Engineer Maysoon E. Zoubi was appointed Secretary General of the Jordanian Ministry of 
Water and Irrigation in 2008. Since then she has been administering the water issues of the 
peace treaty process. She is in charge of Jordanian participation to the EXACT. As part of the 
data collection for this thesis I interviewed Mrs. Zoubi in December 2010. Mrs. Zuobi also 
responded to follow-up questions by email in May 2011.  
 
4.2 Elements of Power Politics  
In this section I address the first hypothesis (H1) outlined in Chapter 2 in order to establish 
whether this explanation finds support in the empirical evidence. I commence with outlining 
the observable implications25
                                                 
25 Before proceeding to the analysis I address the observable implications of the two hypotheses. “Social science 
conclusions cannot be considered reliable if they are not based on theory and data in strong connection with one 
another and forged by formulating and examining the observable implications of a theory” (King et al. 1994: 29).  
  of H1, before I proceed to analyzing the data material.  
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4.2.1 Outlining the Observable Implications of H1 
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, H1 explains the absence of war over water from a 
neo-realist standpoint: “Water is not a sufficiently important issue to go to war over in a 
region where high politics dominate”. The term high politics is used to categorize matters that 
are vital to the very survival of the state, hereunder national and international security 
concerns. By definition a high politics issue is an issue state leaders would be willing to go to 
war over in order to ensure the survival of the state as such.   
 
From a neo-realist point of view the trio of Jordan, Israel and the PA would be considered a 
regional entity or a part of a regional entity where Israel takes the position as the powerful and 
dominant hegemon. As the Palestinian territories are de facto occupied by Israel, and 
consequently largely dependent on the support of the international community to claim their 
right to establish a sovereign state, declaring a war over water resources against Israel would 
not be a rational action. Additionally, the news network Al Jazeera’s recent release of “the 
Palestine Papers” demonstrated “the embarrassing lengths that Abbas was willing to go to 
achieve a peace agreement with Israel” (Rosenberg 2011). Even though the late Jordanian 
King Hussein stated in an interview with the Independent on 15 May 1990 that water was the 
only issue that could again bring Jordan to war with Israel, such an outcome is unlikely as 
Jordan is far from having the military capacities to take on Israel in a war. The 1994 peace 
agreement between Jordan and Israel is another important factor indicating that a war between 
Israel and Jordan is unlikely. Israel on the other hand, the dominant hegemon who is in 
possession of large parts of the three countries’ shared water resources does not have any real 
incentive to go to war over water. The trio can thus be seen as a case of “hegemonic stability” 
with regards to water issues.  
 
In Chapter 3 I established that there has not been any outbreak of war with water being the 
direct triggering cause, and that what researchers actually find is that water scarcity more 
often leads to cooperation than to conflict. In general, neo-realists assume that states will 
engage in cooperation with other states only if they believe that the cooperation will result in 
absolute gains for their part. For Jordan and the PA such absolute gains could include access 
or rights to information on water resources, access or rights to actual water resources, 
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technical assistance to exploit or improve exploitation of water resources and attention and 
support from the international society in dealing with the water scarcity issue in their 
respective countries. For Israel who already is in possession of large parts of the water 
resources, the absolute gains which could possibly result from engaging in cooperation is an 
improved reputation within the international community, as well as a “normalization” of its 
political relations to other Arab states. It is also important to note that strategic alliances with 
Great Powers (i.e. the US) could affect the incentives and the direction of cooperation.  
 
The observable implications of H1 can be summarized as follows: Israel, the regional 
hegemon supported by the US, has access to sufficient water resources and does not consider 
water a matter of high politics. Water scarcity is a more critical issue to Jordan and the PA. 
This implies that control over water resources becomes a strategic advantage for Israel. 
Israel’s involvement with these Parties on water management issues will thus not be 
characterized by a sincere interest in cooperation, as cooperation would imply loss of 
leverage.  
 
4.2.2 Cooperation in lack of tangible results  
When assessing the overall accomplishments of the MWGW, the Nordic Consulting Group 
(2003: 42) states the following: 
 
If the intention [of the projects] was to promote changes in the regional imbalance on water issues, then 
Israel has been the strongest party to the process and project outcomes have so far not changed this 
situation.  
 
The Nordic Consulting Group also points to specific project outcomes that can be seen as 
indicators of the lack of actual accomplishments of the MWGW. In some cases it seems that 
Israel has been more occupied with displaying to the international community that they are in 
fact engaged in cooperation with the PA and other regional actors, than actually valuing the 
cooperation itself. Attili’s statement confirms this perception: “Israel wants to keep it 
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technical; purely technical and they don’t want a project that touches upon allocation or joint 
management.  They want to keep their control on the resources” (Attili 2010 [interview]). To 
exemplify one can look to the The Regional Comparative Study which was an attempt to 
bring Syria and Lebanon into the process of the MWGW. Israel’s public announcement of a 
joint meeting between the five parties made such cooperation with Syria and Lebanon in the 
context of MWGW come to a halt (NCG 2004: 41). Syria and Lebanon pulled out following 
this announcement, due to their official policy stating that “Arab states should not discuss 
functional matters with Israel prior to settlement of core political issues” (Libiszewski 1997: 
392). With the DOP as well, the Nordic Consulting Group concluded that it gave Israel an 
opportunity to show publicly that they are a party to a political process with first and foremost 
Palestinians, without actually committing or dealing with core issues (NCG 2004: 41).  
 
The Israeli Party has also on several occasions proven their lack of willingness to make 
sacrifices or to engage in the cooperation with the other Core Parties. For the Water Atlas 
Project Israel did not make any vital data available concerning water resources in the region 
and Palestinian Territories. On the other side the Palestinians had expectations that this 
process would provide them with access to the information that Israel holds. The Atlas Project 
produced a document which was neither widely distributed nor used. For Israel the key issue 
was to be a contributor to a process. Israel did not relinquish information that it considered of 
strategic importance to its bilateral positions and negotiations (NCG 2004: 40). Also with The 
Waternet Project the Palestinian Authority had hoped to gain access to Israeli data. 
Nonetheless they were unable to gain information regarding Israel’s resource data except for 
the brief period when the regional node was tested (NCG 2004: 26). With regards to The 
Waternet Project the Nordic Consulting Group concluded as follows:  
 
While the overall objective of Waternet was to foster cooperation, the different parties sought to reap 
different benefits from the project. The Palestinians sought cooperation with Israel in order to gain 
access to information from Israel on water related matters. There was less need for the Palestinians to 
seek cooperation with Jordan because representatives from the PA had already visited Jordan on several 
occasions and had unrestricted access to reports. Israel did not need to foster regional cooperation to 
gain access to information. Rather, Israel sought to reap political benefits from being part of a 
multilateral peace process (NCG 2004: 28). Similarly, Jordan had less interest in water cooperation 
since it had access to Israeli information through other channels.   
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During the interview in December 2010, Attili confirmed that the Nordic Consulting Group’s 
conclusion of 2003 is still valid:  
 
If you go through the EXACT project from 1995-2000, you find that the core parties established a 
project that really was supposed to be beneficial to the three of them. But when it came to the sharing of 
data the cooperation failed to establish this. One country decided to withhold their data for security 
reasons – this country was Israel (...). If you look at the cooperation from 2000-2010 you will find that 
only a few projects have been completed. A big problem comes from the lack of possibility to share 
data. People have started talking about not establishing a water databank, but instead water databanks 
[in plural]. This was when we started to lose the original spirit of the EXACT project. People proved 
not to be willing to cooperate when it came to sharing of data. This was when the problems with the 
EXACT started (Attili 2010 [interview]). 
 
The Waternet Project has thus so far not served as a tool for exchange of information, to the 
frustration of especially the Palestinian Party. The Palestinian Party particularly expressed 
discontent about the fact that the objective of the project was to share water data, and the 
project failed to accomplish this. According to Attili, when cooperation is not producing 
results it is better to close down the project and start another which does not have sharing of 
water data as its objective. He also expressed that it is not cooperation with the Israelis that is 
the problem, but cooperation under the pretense of making accomplishments, while the results 
in reality are not producing (Attili 2010 [interview]). This lack of willingness from the part of 
the Israelis to make actual sacrifices and “invest” in the cooperation is an indication of 
support to H1. There is no absolute gain involved for Israel in sharing water data especially 
with the Palestinians, and for this reason they are not willing to make such sacrifices and risk 
losing leverage. But by publicly announcing that they are cooperating with the PA, Lebanon 
and Syria, they might gain an ameliorated image internationally.  
 
The Israeli Party also expressed a general resentment towards the multilateral track, because 
reaching common solutions is difficult when one is representing the “minority party”, as 
Shani states:  
 
In the bilateral discussions you come to more practical questions. You make decisions. In multilateral 
discussions you need to agree on consensus. If decisions were to be made by the majority, then Israel 
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would lose in any vote [against the PA and Jordan]. It must be on consensus. That is one of the 
limitations of the multilateral track (Shani 2010 [interview]). 
 
For this reason, the Israeli Party has attempted to subject most of the fundamental water 
related issues to bilateral discussions. In the bilateral track the Israelis have a de facto veto 
right and is more in control of decisions being made.  
 
Another interesting statement made by Shani, it is that the lack of ambition and goals for the 
multilateral track which is actually the key to its “success”:  
 
One of the keys to the success of the EXACT is that we don’t try to solve the core problems. It is not 
made to replace the negotiations between the governments on core issues. You see, it supplies the 
atmosphere, but it cannot replace the official talks (Shani 2010 [interview]).  
 
This again goes to prove support for H1. The Israeli Party does not see the Multilateral track 
as a platform to actually reach agreements that will contribute to solving the common water 
issues of the three countries.  Establishing cooperative solutions is not the aim of the Israeli 
Party.  
 
The Palestinian Party however, finds the lack of ambition frustrating, because lack of 
ambition also implies few accomplishments, and the donor parties to the Working Group are 
generally involved because they are hoping for political outcomes. When they see that these 
are not producing, they pull out as contributors:  
 
(...) when we try as Palestinians to bring up a project related to the Jordan River Basin, we find that the 
Israelis are taking a defense position that the Jordan River Basin is a bilateral issue, which shouldn’t be 
dealt with multilaterally. This way we are having difficulties finding a project that involves Jordan, 
Israel and Palestine which makes sense, and which can be dealt with as a regional issue. Israel is now 
starting to take the position that the water issue of the Jordan River Basin should be treated as a bilateral 
issue, and that it is a permanent status negotiation issue. It is unfortunate that with this approach, the 
Israelis are minimizing the benefits of the EXACT. This has resulted in the withdrawal of several 
donors, like the Canadians and the British (Attili 2010 [interview]).  
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According to neo-realist theory, Palestinian involvement in the MWGW would also be for the 
absolute gains they might acquire. Funding from donor Parties represents such an absolute 
gain. If donors pull out because of the Israeli Party’s lack of willingness to invest in the 
cooperation, then this means that the Palestinian Party is missing out on possible absolute 
gains. Even though the Palestinian Party has expressed frustration due to the lack of Israeli 
will to invest, we have not seen clear indications that water is considered a high politics issue 
for the Palestinians either. There is a long way from threatening to pull out from a multilateral 
working group to declaring war or an intifada over water. Different factors could explain this 
according to neo-realist theory; either water scarcity still isn’t severe enough in the oPt, or the 
PA is well aware that it has no chance whatsoever to challenge the military hegemon of Israel.  
 
When it comes to the Jordanian Party, what might seem surprising at first glance is that their 
perception of the possible outcomes of the cooperation is rather similar to the Israeli 
perception:  
 
The EXACT will not produce additional amounts of water per se. If you look at the EXACT it is not a 
project that will help produce big amounts of water. (...) The EXACT will not solve the water problem 
(Zoubi 2010 [interview]).  
 
Jordanian Authorities have close ties with the US and is largely dependent on US aid money 
for their national budget. As mentioned under the section on observable implications of H1, 
Great Power politics might influence state’s behavior if any of the Parties are allied with or 
dependent on the US. It is not unlikely that the Jordanian perception of the cooperation might 
be a result of these ties26
 
, and that as a strategic alliance partner of the US in the Middle East 
they are counting on US assistance if the water scarcity situation aggravates further. Thus no 
need for either expecting or pushing for the establishment of cooperative solutions.   
                                                 
26 In addition to providing assistance to the water, health, economic growth, education, and democracy & 
governance sectors in Jordan, USAID/Jordan implements a multi-year, policy-based balance of payment 
program. This assistance is provided in the form of a cash transfer. During 1997 - 2006, USAID has provided 
$1.163 billion for the cash transfer program to Jordan (USAID 2007).  
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4.2.3 The Uneven Balance of Power, Great Power Politics and Water 
as a Strategic Resource 
It is evident that the uneven balance of power among the Core Parties and the fact that neither 
the Palestinians, nor the Jordanians have much leverage encountering the Israelis at the 
negotiation table is affecting the outcome of the cooperation. At an EXACT meeting which 
took place in Jordan in June 2010 this problem became evident; the Palestinian Party was 
definitely the most eager to set up projects and making accomplishments through the 
MWGW. The Jordanian Party was supportive of the Palestinian suggestions, while the Israeli 
Party had a very “laid-back” attitude towards suggestions and emphasized that all projects 
would need to be thoroughly discussed and evaluated before even considering initiation. The 
Palestinian Water Minister explains the negotiation climate by stating the facts:     
 
In the case of Israel-Palestine the occupation is still there. No matter how you see it, we remain the 
occupied and they remain the occupier (Attili 2010 [interview]).  
 
It does not matter how much one insists on getting projects up and running if this is not in the 
interest of the dominant hegemon.  
 
The United States serves as the gavel holder for the MWGW. Due to its position 
internationally and regionally in the Middle East (as Israel’s most important ally and as 
substantial contributor to the Jordanian National Budget) their possibility of influencing the 
direction of the cooperation is highly present. The Parties’ perception of the US contribution 
as gavel holder is not unanimous, but the common feature of the descriptions is that the US 
has not taken advantage of its role as gavel holder to push through solutions:  
 
From what I see they function as a sort of a mediator. They run [the EXACT meetings], but I’m not sure 
how dominant they are. They assist us in agreeing on the agenda, they try to be fair and to see that 
everything is going well. They do a good job, they don’t force (Shani 2010 [interview])  
 
You know in this project they are very helpful, and they have the power to get these people together and 
meet. And in Jordan per se, the United States are very dynamic. 80-85% of the water projects are 
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financed by USAID money, and it is grand money. They are very helpful in the region, bilaterally: from 
government to government (Zoubi 2010 [interview]).  
 
(...) when Israel objects to a project, people don’t put pressure on Israel; because this is the environment 
of the EXACT. I think the donor countries and the gavel holder can play a better role (Attili 2010 
[interview]).  
 
The US reluctance to put pressure on Israel to make sacrifices in negotiation with the PA 
might very well be a result of the Israel Lobby’s27
 
 influence on US foreign policy, as revealed 
by Mearsheimer and Walt in their article “Washington has given Israel wide latitude in 
dealing with the Occupied Territories, even when its actions were at odds with stated U.S. 
policy” (2006: 31). This paradox is explained by the Israel Lobby’s unmatched ability to play 
the game of interest-group politics, made possible by the multiple channels of influence that 
the US’ divided form of government provides (Mearsheimer & Walt 2006: 42). Due to the 
lobby there is now a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy, and the Jewish-American 
leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel (Mearsheimer & Walt 2006: 41). A central 
point to Mearsheimer and Walt is that the Lobby pushes the US to support Israeli policy 
unconditionally, even when this goes against US national interest. Even though it would have 
improved the US’ image in the Arab world had they been able to push through an agreement 
on Palestinian water rights or a joint water management regime between the three countries, 
they will not do this as long as Israeli Authorities oppose. As long as keeping water data to 
themselves provides Israel with leverage, Israel actually has a “counterincentive” to engage in 
cooperation.   
Finally, a last point indicating that the neo-realistic explanation does find support in the 
empirical evidence concerns Uri Shani’s (2010 [interview]) statement on the importance of 
water as a resource for Israel:  
 
                                                 
27 The Israel Lobby is defined as a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape 
U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. The core of the lobby consists of American Jews who make a 
significant effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it advances Israel’s interests 
(Mearsheimer & Walt 2006: 40).  
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(...) Abu al-Assaid said to me that when they have the Palestinian state it will be kind of crippled 
because they will not have sovereignty on their sky, they will not have an army strong enough to defend 
themselves, so they will try to charge sovereignty on water. For them water will be the symbol of 
sovereignty. Because of this water is a core subject for them. For Israel, water is just another subject 
(...). 
 
Many things can be said about this statement. I am not questioning the fact that the 
Palestinians wish to establish sovereignty on their water resources. However, how one should 
interpret that “water is not a core issue for Israel” is a different issue. It might be true that 
Israeli Authorities are not so concerned about water scarcity, as they are currently building 
desalination plants along the coastline28
 
 and they do not have problems financing such 
solutions. However, from a neo-realist standpoint, knowing how desperately the PA needs 
and wants to claim their rights to the waters of the Mountain Aquifer of the West Bank, the 
control of this resource as mentioned becomes an issue of leverage and a strategic advantage 
for the Israeli Authorities. Whether or not Israel would actually be willing to go to war over 
water resources is a highly debated issue in the research literature. For example Beaumont 
(1997: 368) states that “What becomes obvious then is that Israel has probably been stressing 
its supposed water needs for strategic reasons in case it wishes to take military action over 
some issue. Politically it is more acceptable to claim to be preserving the water needs of one’s 
own people than to be invading another country to gain control of land”. During the interview 
in December 2010, Uri Shani however expressed his confidence that water will not be an 
issue hindering peace between Israelis and Palestinians: “I’m sure water will not be the main 
obstacle preventing peace. We will solve it. Maybe not me, but it will be solved”.  
4.3 Institutions Matter  
4.3.1 Outlining the Observable Implications of H2 
The founding assumption of H2 is the neo-liberal argument that states will cooperate when it 
is in their common interest to do so. In general, neo-liberals argue that states will cooperate 
                                                 
28 In 2007 Israel began operating its first large-scale desalination plant, and currently has plans for producing 
between one-third and one-half of freshwater consumption by 2015 (Drezin et al. (2008) as cited in Fischendler 
et al. forthcoming).  
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when this is mutually beneficial to them, and relative gains are considered a sufficient 
incentive to cooperate. Especially with transboundary water resources, the risk of not 
cooperating is a situation of “tragedy of the commons”. Knowing that water is a scarce 
resource and that the problems related to water scarcity will only worsen in the years to come, 
the neo-liberal prediction would be cooperation rather than conflict over water in the Middle 
East since cooperative solutions imply a considerable reduction of costs. In addition to 
common interests, “trade, treaty and technology” are factors neo-liberals argue to have a 
peace-inducing effect on bilateral relations. Trade leads to economic interdependence which 
gives each party a stake in the economic well-being of the other. Intergovernmental 
institutions (referred to as “treaty” in section 2.5.2) will have a positive effect on cooperation 
because they can mediate among conflicting parties, reduce uncertainty by conveying 
information, they assist in problem-solving, they have a socializing and norm-shaping effect, 
and they generate narratives of mutual identification (Russett & Oneal 2001). The 
technology-argument is based on the idea that population growth leads to a modernization of 
the industry, and better utilization of resources, making resource scarcity nihil ad rem. If the 
neo-liberal explanation for the absence of war over water has solid grounds, we would expect 
to see some of the above mentioned indicators in the empirical evidence.  
 
To sum up one can say that if the neo-liberal explanation for the absence of war over water 
has solid grounds this is a result of the Parties' common understanding that water is 
considered such a vital resource that they recognize that cooperation is the only viable option. 
Under the umbrella of the MWGW this perception would materialize in serious efforts to 
establish a dialogue leading to durable cooperative solutions.   
 
4.3.2 A Genuine Interest in Cooperation     
The Nordic Consulting Group (2004) concluded that the Parties considered the expansion of 
the scope of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) as a crucial and vital step expressing a 
genuine intention to undertake cooperation. The Core Parties confirmed that the DOP would 
not affect or alter in any manner, the bilateral or other agreements or undertakings among 
them. Nor would it prohibit or constrain any bilateral arrangements, understandings or 
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agreements aimed at enhancing cooperation in water-related matters. This latter confirmation 
was crucial for the Parties as cooperation on new and additional water resources is considered 
to be one out of many aspects in the field of cooperation. The Palestinians for example, 
confirm that priority in this area is to achieve cooperation on all shared water resources, 
including new and additional resources. As such the DOP elaborated a mechanism for 
cooperation even though it was not legally binding (NCG 2004: 25).  
 
During the interviews all Parties put strong emphasis on the fact that even during times of 
political crisis (i.e. the Intifada29
 
) the processes continued and the dialogue among the three 
Core Parties was maintained with technical level meetings centered on joint agreed project 
activities. Thus as a tool for promoting cooperation, the projects have proven their relevance 
as far as Israel, Jordan and the PA are concerned.  
Something that has been beneficial with the EXACT even in the difficult period [the intifada], is that 
you find Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians sitting around one table. We have repeatedly stated that 
we have to continue doing this because we provide an example, especially now that the other 
multilateral track projects have been stopped (Attili 2010 [interview]).  
 
The Waternet Project developed in 1996 was the first joint initiative by the participating 
parties to implement parts of the Declaration of Principles. It is important to note that among 
the various working groups established under the Madrid process only a few were able to 
show real tangible progress of which the MWGW is one of the more prominent ones (NCG 
2004: 49). According to Shani, Attili and Zuobi this is a consequence of the respective views 
of their Authorities of water being a “different” resource which does require international 
cooperation.  
 
We are there not because we volunteered, but because the cooperation is important to us (Uri Shani 
2010 [interview]).  
 
                                                 
29 The second intifada (Palestinian uprising) lasted from 2000-2006. It is claimed to have officially ended in 
November 2006, even though there is still ongoing violence.  
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This is the only program that has proven to sustain during the 15 years, even during the intifada. We 
meet in the same spirit. It is there, for 15 years we have had 30 meetings (Zoubi 2010 [interview]).  
 
The biannual meetings have also resulted in the establishment of friendship among the 
delegates. Not only among the high official representatives, but also among the participants 
on the technical level (Shani 2010 [interview]; Attili 2010 [interview]; Zoubi 2010 
[interview]). This is in line with what Dinar (2008) refers to as the formation of epistemic 
communities30
 
, which may positively influence policy makers. The members of an epistemic 
community are often in possession of knowledge which gives them a certain authority to 
advice on policy development and implementation concerning issues that the politicians are 
not necessarily acquainted with.   
4.3.3 Water – “A Different Resource” 
Distinctive for all three Parties during the interviews was that their perceptions of the problem 
of water scarcity and its consequences were very similar and coordinated. All three parties 
agreed that the Middle East is suffering greatly from water scarcity, and that the research 
community’s prediction that this is a situation that will worsen in the years to come is correct. 
Especially dominant was the conviction among the parties that climate change will have a 
major impact on the water situation in the three countries, because of the longer and more 
recurring drought periods that are expected. On the question of why cooperation between the 
parties on water seemed to have a better survival capacity than cooperation on other issues, all 
parties replied that the cause for this was the specific qualities of water as a resource, being 
different than other resources – relatively inexpensive, but completely indispensable. These 
specific characteristics of water are according to the parties the reason why even when the 
political and diplomatic relations between the three countries have been under the most stress 
(i.e. under the second Intifada) the Parties have continued to meet and discuss water issues in 
the context of EXACT in a friendly tone. All three Parties expressed a fear of what the 
consequences would be if they did not find a solution to the water issue. The Jordanian Party 
went the furthest by expressing an actual fear for “conflict over water” as a potential result if 
pressing issues were not dealt with (Zuobi 2010 [interview]).  
                                                 
30 Ref. to section 2.5.2 where Dinar’s argument about epistemic communities is presented.  
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(...) Water is more demanding. You need to supply water, period. This necessity brings more flexibility. 
It is easy to see that in economy and in development, you don’t agree. Even on the environment. Ok, 
you don’t agree, and you are not willing to change your standpoint. But with water, even if you don’t 
agree you still need to drink. This brings a much more practical attitude (Shani 2010 [interview]).   
 
We have to go through with this project, and we have to keep water out of the conflict. This is why we 
are pushing towards finding a solution. Water is solvable, not like other issues. A solution to the water 
issue will be a win-win solution for all parties (Attili 2010 [interview]).  
 
The EXACT is focusing on the most challenging issue in the Middle East, which is water. Believe me, 
most of the countries in the Middle East are running out of water. If this problem is not handled well 
and peacefully, this may lead to a war (Zoubi 2010 [interview]).  
 
These three statements made by the interview objects go to support H2, because they 
emphasize the importance of water as an explanatory factor for cooperation. The qualities of 
water both as a fundamentally important resource for people’s survival, and as a resource that 
induces a practical approach, along with the risk of conflict over water if the issue is not 
solved are all arguments in favour of water being considered important to the point of 
perceiving cooperation as the sole option. 
 
4.3.4 The Role of the Donor Parties 
Another important point to emphasize is that all parties pointed to the role of the donor 
countries as key players in keeping the cooperation alive. At times when the cooperation has 
been under stress due to different factors, the donor countries have played a supporting role 
making sure the EXACT stays on its feet. Attili pointed to the current situation of the EXACT 
Working Group and explained that not long ago the Palestinian party had considered pulling 
out of the Working Group because they felt that the cooperation was not producing enough 
results. However, the Norwegian diplomats involved in the cooperation had convinced the 
Palestinian Party that they would reenter the Working Group as a donor party and commit 
their efforts to lifting the cooperation to a higher level, also producing political results. This 
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had been of decisive significance for the Palestinian party’s decision to stay in the working 
group.  
 
Water has a special nature. The people in the region are suffering from scarcity of water, and water is 
part of the conflict. But you find a certain determination from the donors to keep this project alive 
(Attili 2010 [interview]).  
 
This argument goes in support of the neo-liberal assumption that “treaty” (international 
institutions, organizations, agencies, treaties and agreements) can promote changes in national 
policy and reinforce cooperative solutions. This also reflects the fact that the donor parties 
also consider water to be highly decisive issue in the Middle East, and that putting donor 
money and efforts into the MWGW is worthwhile because this hopefully contributes to the 
avoidance of conflict. The will of the international community to keep the project (The 
MWGW and the EXACT) going, is an indication of support to H2 because it reveals a 
conviction that the water issue is important enough to invest time, efforts an donor money in.  
 
4.3.5 The MWGW and the Peace Process 
When it comes to the evaluation of the effect the MWGW has had on the peace process, there 
is some uncertainty among the parties: 
 
Unfortunately [the MWGW] has no effect [on the Peace Process] because there is no link between 
multilateral and bilateral. It is one of the Palestinian demands that there should be a link. We cannot 
discuss the Jordan River Basin through bilateral negotiations when it is a multilateral basin (Attili 2010 
[interview]).  
 
Meanwhile, all Parties agree that had the MWGW been functioning more optimally, the 
effects on the Peace Process would be positive.  
 
To have a working group like this is important, because if you don’t face each other and discuss you 
will never reach a solution (Zoubi 2010 [interview]).  
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The Israelis are realizing now, that the Palestinians do have right to water, but the argument is on the 
source of the water. The Palestinians say that they have a right to the water in the Jordan River, but the 
Israelis say that there is no water in the Jordan River. That’s fine, but if you have 50 you divide it 
between the two parties... but this is between them (Zoubi 2010 [interview]).  
 
It could be one of the catalyst factors that could contribute to a solution once there is a common interest, 
and I do think there is a common interest in avoiding pollution and protecting the groundwater aquifers 
(...) (Attili 2010 [interview]).  
 
All Parties have strongly emphasized the need for and the usefulness of an open and frank 
dialogue in an unofficial setting such as the MWGW and the EXACT meetings. However, the 
Peace Process stagnated during the second intifada. This is also an issue emphasized by 
Fischendler et al. (forthcoming) who describes the period prior to the second Intifada as a 
time of momentum for cooperation between Israel and the PA, but with the outbreak of the 
Intifada the Israelis opted for unilateral solutions “[a cooperative approach was] a preferred 
spatial strategy from both an environmental and economic perspective, but was deemed 
unworkable from a political and security one” (Fischendler et al. forthcoming: 16-17). 
Following the outbreak of the Intifada, Israel retreated from its cooperative efforts and shifted 
to the adaptation without cooperation strategy as the cost of cooperative choices drastically 
increased during political turmoil, and the potential benefits of donor money dissipated 
(Fischendler et al. forthcoming: 19).    
 
To the Palestinian Party it is the lack of tangible results of the cooperation which is the 
explanatory factor for the missing positive effect on the Peace Process. Unfortunately, this 
argument weakens H2 as it is an indication that the efforts put into the MWGW have not been 
deep-rooted enough to positively affect the Peace Process.  
 
4.4 Lessons Learned 
There has been no war over water in the Middle East, not even during high tension periods 
when the water scarcity issue has been severe in Jordan, Israel and the oPt did a conflict erupt 
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over water. According to Beaumont (1997: 356) the reason why “water wars” are still (despite 
the absence of actual water wars) considered a potential security threat by national and 
international actors, is that “the concept of environmental security has now entered the 
military vocabulary. In the post-Cold War period, military establishments have sought 
evidence that conflicts will still occur, and have thus focused sharply on the novel idea that 
water might be a likely cause of war”. Beaumont therefore claims that it is not the actual 
threat of a water war that affects the inclusion of water scarcity on the security strategy 
agendas, but merely the incorporation of the idea of this threat within the military 
establishment.  
 
Now, after investigating the case of political relations between Jordan, Israel and the PA with 
regards to their shared water resources – how can we explain the absence of war over water 
between these countries?  
 
The importance of the dialogue between the three countries in preventing conflict has been 
emphasized by all Parties. They continued to meet under the “umbrella” of the MWGW to 
discuss possible solutions, test projects etc. concerning access to freshwater resources and 
wastewater treatment, even during times of high tension such as the Intifada. This is the 
strongest argument in favour of the H2 explanation of the absence of war over water. It goes 
to indicate that water is such an important issue that the Parties were able to put aside the 
hostilities and negotiate and discuss cooperative solutions because water is vital to the 
survival of their respective populations. The strong emphasis on the importance of this 
dialogue was a central issue for all three interview objects, and this was also put forward by 
the Nordic Consulting Group’s report (2004). Peters (1999: 93) also points to this fact when 
stating that:  
 
(...) the multilaterals have offered Israel and the Arab world an alternative diplomatic space to engage in 
low-risk communication and exchange, to develop new forms of cooperation, and to generate creative 
solutions and plans for the future – for the first time – on a regional level.  
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The MWGW seems to have had an influence on norms and perceptions among the Parties to 
the cooperation. Shani (2011 [interview]) insinuates that going to war over water is out of the 
question because of these commonly developed norms:  
 
Today I would say the situation is more stable especially between Israel, Jordan and Palestine because 
we have reached the understanding that finding common solutions is more fruitful. We will gain more 
from this type of approach. 
 
However, the lack of tangible results stemming from the cooperation is another prominent 
feature of the MWGW and the EXACT cooperation, and it is also the strongest evidence in 
favour of the H1 explanation for the absence of war over water. Neo-realists argue that 
”antagonistic parties in the high politics of war and diplomacy, tend to be incapable of 
cooperating even in the realm of low “economic” and welfare politics”.  Libiszewski (1997: 
387) argues that when a dispute over water resources is embedded in a larger political 
conflict, the former can neither be conceived as discrete conflict over a resource nor be 
resolved as such. The Parties to the MWGW insist that water is and should be treated as a 
separate subject to the conflict between Israel and the PA, notably because it is such a vital 
resource. But viewed from a crude political perspective, the work of the water group in itself 
did not produce many concrete decisions such as formalized treaties or functional cooperative 
projects. In the establishment of the 1994 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, the 
settlement of water issues was enabled by a clarification of each other’s water rights and thus 
settling the distribution conflict. The PA and Israel have not been able to settle the dispute 
over water rights – not to the waters in the Jordan River, nor to the waters of the Mountain 
Aquifer. This has by many been presented as the main obstacle to solving the water issues 
between Israel and the PA.  
 
The power asymmetry and the hegemony characterizing the relations between the three 
Parties to the MWGW have definitely impeded incentives to making sacrifices and to 
establish a functioning water regime. This imbalance has also worked as an incentive for 
Israel to opt for unilateral solutions – a strategy termed “Unilateral Environmentalism” by 
Fischendler et al (forthcoming). Technological development might be an explanatory factor 
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for the Israeli Party’s currently more relaxed approach to the water issue. The unilateral 
investment in desalination plants seems to have relieved some of the Israeli stress to control 
water resources.  
  
By taking a deeper look into the causal mechanisms between water scarcity and international 
relations it has become clear that the linkages between these two factors are indeed intrinsic, 
and it is difficult to provide a clear answer of cause and effect. The explanation for the 
absence of war over water however does seem to lie somewhere between the two proposed 
hypotheses, with stronger support for H1 than for H2. The lack of tangible results outweighs 
the emphasis on the importance of dialogue. Water scarcity has not proven to be important 
enough, especially to the Israeli Party, for them to be willing to make sacrifices and engage 
full-heartedly in cooperative solutions. Actions speak louder than words, in politics more than 
anywhere else.  
 
The lack of functional cooperative solutions however, implies that the oPt and Jordan will 
continue to suffer from water scarcity in the years to come. They do not have the financial 
capacities of Israel to establish unilateral solutions such as high cost desalination plants. But 
for now, the situation of water scarcity in the three countries is currently a question of not 
having enough water for agricultural use (Brown & Crawford 2009). Water scarcity has yet to 
become a question of life and death, as “most families, even in the remote places have water 
to drink for the days to come” (Shani 2010 [interview]). But if the predictions on climate 
change prove to be correct, and we see droughts occurring more frequently and over longer 
time periods in the Middle East, it goes without saying that this issue could develop into a 
question of life and death for some of the region’s inhabitants.  
 
Prediction in the social sciences is a highly controversial subject31
                                                 
31 Social scientists have generally failed to predict the most important events in history, such as for example the 
fall of the Soviet Union.  
, and I will not attempt to 
maneuver the art of prophecy. However, if the day comes when the inhabitants of either 
Jordan, Israel or the oPt do not have sufficient water to survive because “the well eventually 
did dry up”, the question of water scarcity inevitably becomes a question of “high politics”.  If 
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and until this happens, time may have been the explanatory factor for the absence of war over 
water.  
 
72 
 
5. Conclusion 
For several decades scholars have been predicting war over water to break out in the Middle 
East. It must be considered a paradox that even though the research literature today has turned 
its focus towards cooperation instead of conflict over water, the idea that war over water is 
still dominating the security strategies of certain states and the policies of international 
organizations. The issue of why no war over water has occurred, despite the pessimistic 
predictions of the Environmental Security writers, is an issue not many political scientists 
have addressed. It might even seem as if there has been a direct transition from the 
assumption of conflict as the natural consequence of water scarcity, to an acceptance of 
cooperation as its actual consequence. In this thesis I have attempted to address the issue of 
this “missing link” between thorough descriptions of the condition under which a war over 
water is likely to break out and the absence of such a war.  The method I have used was to 
take a deeper look into two cases of bilateral relations. Israel-PA is a case where a war over 
water is highly probable according to Homer-Dixon’s conditions. Israel-Jordan on the other 
hand is a case where the outbreak of conflict is rather improbable. I have interviewed key 
policy makers from the three countries to get their perspectives on the situation, and I have 
completed the interview material with scientific articles and third party reports on the 
accomplishments of the MWGW.  
 
With different theoretical approaches as base arguments I developed two hypothetical 
explanations for the absence of war over water. H1 was based on the neo-realist idea that 
water is not considered a high politics issue by the Parties involved, and has thus not been 
important enough to go to war over. H2 was based on a neo-liberal assumption that all three 
Parties recognize water as a resource so fundamental for people’s survival, that cooperation to 
solve the water scarcity issue is the only viable option. Through my analysis of the empirical 
evidence I found that the relations between Jordan, Israel and the PA with regards to water 
issues are highly complex phenomena. The three countries are Parties to the Multilateral 
Working Group on water, a platform for cooperation and exchange of ideas established as a 
part of the Peace Process in the early 1990s. This cooperation has stayed operative, despite 
the closure of the other Multilateral Working Groups, and despite the difficult relations 
between Israelis and Palestinians during the second Intifada. I have investigated the Parties’ 
73 
 
perception of this cooperation, and I have assessed the accomplishments and the non-
accomplishments of the MWGW and the EXACT Committee, in order to establish insight on 
the causal mechanisms explaining the absence of war over water. Despite the fact that 
international relations between the three Parties have proven to be rather complex and that 
addressing the direct links between cause and effect has constituted a challenge, I conclude 
that H1 finds more support than H2. The strongest argument in support of the neo-liberal 
explanation of H2, that water is considered a vital resource too important for people’s survival 
to fight over, is that all three Parties stayed in the Working Group and kept meeting 
biannually even during the second Intifada. This indicates a strong will to cooperate and a 
belief that cooperation is the ultimate solution.  
 
The MWGW however has not produced results in terms of solving any of the three Core 
Parties water scarcity issues. The greatest deception must be said to be the failure to 
accomplish the main goal of the EXACT project, notably to create a common water databank 
giving all three Parties access to information on water quantity and quality in their common 
rivers and aquifers. The Israelis’ reluctance to publish their data caused this project to fail. 
When it comes to politics, actions do speak louder than words. If it was so that the Israeli 
Party strongly believed that cooperation is the necessary and only viable option, they would 
not hesitate to the point that they have on providing water data. This is the empirical evidence 
providing the strongest support for H1, as it reflects the fact that water is not a sufficiently 
important issue for Israel to sacrifice the strategic negotiation advantage this secrecy 
constitutes.   
 
Israeli reluctance to provide water data has caused frustration especially in the Palestinian 
camp, and all three Parties seem to have had differentiating perceptions of what the goal and 
the purpose of the MWGW should be. All of these factors however, have not lead to the 
outbreak of a war over water – a supplementary indication that water is currently not 
sufficiently important to fight over.  
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In the analysis I concluded that even though water, till this day has not gained sufficient 
importance to be considered a matter of high politics, this does not permit us to claim that a 
war over water will never take place. If the day comes, when the “well actually dries up” and 
Middle Eastern governments no longer can ensure daily drinking water to their populations, 
the question of access to freshwater resources will definitely climb upwards on the political 
agenda. Making predictions in political science has proven to be a dangerous game, as 
scholars usually prove to be wrong when anticipating future events. When dealing with 
complex social phenomena such as international cooperation and conflict, which obviously 
depends on so many different factors, the art of prophecy is further complicated. Regardless 
of what the future brings, needless to say that water as the source of life has the potential of 
causing conflict, and that there is a wide range of options available for those who wish to 
avoid such outcomes.  
 
Central to the future of bilateral and multilateral relations, is the role taken by the US and the 
other donor countries. An important finding in this analysis was that the positions taken 
especially by the US and to some extent other donor countries have the potential of directing 
the cooperation. If strong efforts are made by the international community with the US in the 
lead, it should be possible to establish a functioning water regime. The spring of 2011, 
characterized as “The Arab Spring” has seen dramatic changes in the regional landscape in 
the Arab world. After decades of apparent stability, popular uprisings have led to optimism 
for a democratic transition in Egypt, to brutal violence and fear of state collapse in Libya 
(Anderson 2011). The unrest caught most people by surprise, both inside and outside the 
region, and has fundamentally upended beliefs about the Arab world. High unemployment, 
low purchasing power (poverty) and discontent with inadequate governance have been 
pointed to as main factors causing the popular uprisings. It goes without saying that if the 
populations of the Arab countries are willing to demonstrate and topple their leaders because 
of unemployment; they would not hesitate to do the same for drinking water. For the sake of 
peace, stability and the wellbeing of the populations of the Middle Eastern countries, the 
aggravating situation of water scarcity is an issue that needs to be addressed.  
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5.1 Advice for Future Research 
As mentioned in section 2.5.2 a popular approach to research on “water cooperation” in recent 
years has been to conduct quantitative analyses on the factors inducing cooperation, river 
treaties and water management regimes. Insight from this research on the political relations 
between Jordan, Israel and the PA with regards to their common freshwater resources might 
prove useful for creating and including new variables in such aggregated analyses. Song and 
Whittington (2004) mentioned in their study that they were unable to include variables 
containing information the level of resources riparians devoted to the treaty negotiation 
process, the assistance of outside parties in aiding the negotiation process, and level of 
funding from parties outside the river basin for implementing the provisions of the treaty in 
their study. The results of my analysis indicate that these variables do in fact influence the 
possibilities of establishing treaties. The same goes for the power asymmetry between the 
Parties sharing the resources.  
 
The empirical evidence and the analysis resulting from this analysis might also prove useful 
for interpreting Israel’s relation to other neighboring countries (i.e. Syria and Lebanon) with 
regards to their common water resources. As mentioned in section 3.2 Syria and Lebanon are 
not de facto suffering from water scarcity as per today. But if the estimated demographic 
changes and the predicted environmental changes materialize, water scarcity will hit these 
countries as well in the years to come. If the situation produces that Israel is the only country 
in the region with sufficient freshwater resources, with its surrounding neighbors suffering 
from scarcity it is needless to say that this will be considered provocative and unjust and that 
it might function as a supplementary destabilizing factor for Israel’s relations with its 
neighbors.      
 
Another issue, actualized by the events of the Arab Spring is the possibility of internal 
uprising over scarce resources. Conflict over water resources might also materialize as 
intercommunal disputes if Middle Eastern Governments are not capable of providing their 
citizens with sufficient freshwater resources.   
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Appendix 4: Interview Guide 1 
Interview Guide 1 
Warm up questions 
- When did you first get involved with the Multilateral Working Group on Water? 
- Can you give a short description of the EXACT Working Group (How often do you 
meet, how are the meetings organized, what are usually the main topics of 
discussion?) 
- Can you give a brief description of what you consider to be the main problems related 
to water scarcity in the Middle East (or in Israel, Palestine, and Jordan)?  
 
Main questionnaire 
 
On EXACT and the Multilateral Working Group on Water 
- What do you consider being the purpose of EXACT? 
- Do you feel that the Exact Committee is serving its purpose? 
- What does your government want to accomplish with EXACT? 
- Do you think EXACT has accomplished any of these goals?  
- If Yes: Which have been the major accomplishments of the EXACT Working Group? 
- If No: What do you consider to be the reasons why EXACT is not accomplishing the 
goals it was set out to? 
- How would you describe the negotiation climate in the EXACT Working Group? 
- What would you say are the intentions of the other two core parties, with their 
participation in EXACT? 
- How would you describe the role of the United States in the cooperation? 
- How would you describe the role of the other donor countries? 
- At the time of the establishment of the Multilateral Working Group on Water four 
other multilateral working groups were established notably on refugees, arms control 
and regional security, environment, and regional economic development, these 
working groups have all ceded existing. Do you have an opinion on why these 
working groups were closed down? 
- What would you say are the causes for the persistence of the Multilateral Working 
Group on Water?  
- Do you know of any other forums for discussion/cooperation on water in the region 
(bilateral/multilateral/formal/informal/local level/national level/existing or in the 
phase of planning)? Do you consider these more important than the MWGW for the 
future water security in the region? 
- The problem of water scarcity in the Middle East is assumed by researchers to 
aggravate in the years to come as a per capita decrease in water is predicted. How 
would you describe the prospects for the water situation in the Middle East? Do you 
think water will become more central to international relations in the region, and 
specifically between Israel and Palestine? 
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On the Peace Process in general 
- What would you say has been the impact of the Working Group on Water on the 
Peace Process in general? 
- Do you consider Multilateral Working Groups as a possible means to reach a peaceful 
solution of the conflict in the Middle East? 
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Appendix 5: Interview Guide 2  
Interview Guide 2 (follow-up) 
In my thesis I present two hypothetical explanations for the absence of war over water in the 
Middle East: 
1) Water is not a sufficiently important issue to go to war over in a region where high politics 
dominate. 
or 
2) Water is a resource which is fundamentally too important for people's survival to go to war 
over. 
I would like to hear your opinion on which of these explanations you find more correct. You 
can either answer generally for the Middle East, or with PA-Israel as the reference.   
I would also like to hear your prospects on the EXACT cooperation for the coming 1-2 years. 
In which direction do you believe the cooperation will go? Will you keep meeting twice per 
year? Will it be meetings with "high level participation" like in Oslo? What do you think the 
EXACT will accomplish in the next few years? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
